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INTRODUCTION 
 
What forces shape corporation law?  The basic framework that 
produces corporation law in the United States is readily apparent.  Under 
the United States’ system of corporate law federalism,1 each state has the 
power to make its own laws concerning how corporations are to be 
governed, and a corporation may then select which state’s law will regulate 
its internal affairs by incorporating in that state, even if the corporation is 
based elsewhere.2  Identifying this framework does not, however, explain 
how such basic arrangements set in motion the complex processes that have 
over the past century produced modern corporation law. 
When explaining corporation law’s evolution, scholars have identified 
as overwhelmingly important a consequence of corporation law federalism:  
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 1. See Gregory Mark, The Court and the Corporation:  Jurisprudence, Localism, and 
Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (providing a historical account of the development of 
corporate law federalism); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 
30 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2004) (noting that the United States' corporate law federalism allows 
for state innovation in corporate governance).  For corporations with publicly traded 
securities, federal securities laws also play a significant role, especially since the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (2002).  See 
generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a piece of 
poorly conceived, ineffective legislation that works against the beneficial system of 
corporate federalism). 
 2. The corporation’s choice of law occurs under the well-recognized internal affairs 
doctrine.  See Frederick Tung, Before Competition:  Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 
32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006) (discussing the internal affairs doctrine, its origins, and its effect 
upon state competition for incorporation). 
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the opportunity it creates for states to compete for incorporations.3  A state 
presumably benefits when a corporation chooses to incorporate in it, and it 
has long been apparent that some states have in some historical periods 
consciously competed to attract incorporations.4  Presumably, states have 
competed by changing their corporate laws to attract corporations that 
might otherwise incorporate elsewhere.  While a number of states have 
competed for corporate charters, Delaware has proven the clear winner in 
this competition, and is now legal home to a majority of the publicly traded 
corporations in the United States.5 
Although scholars agree that states have competed for incorporations, 
they disagree on the particulars; corporation law experts still spar over the 
effects of this competition, disputing whether the laws that such 
competition produced favor corporate management or shareholders,6 and 
whether states still compete for incorporations at all or whether most have 
abandoned the field to Delaware.7  Scholars have also disagreed over why 
particular states seek to attract incorporations; earlier accounts focused on 
the benefits that accrued to a state's citizens when taxpaying corporations 
relocated there and presumably reduced the tax load for ordinary 
taxpayers,8 while more recent accounts have sought to identify interest 
groups within a state that particularly benefit from the legal presence of 
newly incorporated (or reincorporated) firms.9  Despite the different 
 3. The notion of competition for corporate charters is ubiquitous in corporate law 
scholarship.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:  
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2006) (“One of the fundamental 
questions facing corporate law scholarship concerns regulatory competition.”); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporate Choice:  Evidence on 
the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (“One 
of the most important questions in U.S. corporate law is whether competition in the 
corporate charter market represents a ‘race to the top’ or a ‘race to the bottom.’”). 
 4. Although scholars dispute whether states now compete for incorporations, such 
competition certainly occurred in the past.  See infra Part III (chronicling changes in state 
corporation laws since the 1920s). 
 5. According to the State of Delaware’s Division of Corporations, more than 50% of 
all publicly traded U.S. corporations, and more than 60% of the Fortune 500, are 
incorporated in Delaware.  Delaware Division of Corporations, http://corp.delaware.gov 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
 6. See infra Part I (discussing the debate about whether state competition produces a 
“race to the top” or “race to the bottom). 
 7. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:  
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554-55 (2002) 
(noting that Delaware, contrary to conventional wisdom, faces little competition from other 
states in the market for incorporation); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State 
Competition in Corporation Law, 55 STAN L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (positing that Delaware 
is the only state that makes significant efforts to attract incorporation). 
 8. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 668 (1974). 
 9. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
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opinions among scholars, the debates share a basic assumption that 
competition for charters was the fundamental engine that produced today’s 
corporation law.10 
This Article complicates this view through an account of many states’ 
adoption of self-consciously “modern” corporation laws during the 1920s 
and 1930s.11  Although scholars have almost completely overlooked this 
development,12 the movement to adopt modern corporation laws in these 
decades throws sharp light on larger presumptions about the evolution of 
corporation law.  While inter-state competition for corporate charters is an 
important element in the story, this account reveals that competition was 
not the only driver of legal change.  This Article shows how their drafters 
designed these new laws, not merely to attract corporations, but to protect 
shareholders, and how they aimed less to attract out-of-state incorporators 
than to retain incorporations of corporations already located there.  Interest 
groups were certainly involved in drafting and adoption—the laws gained 
great support from state bar associations—but alongside these local interest 
groups worked legal reformers, and the laws were the product not only of 
local needs but of broader national trends and of an interstate network 
promoting corporate law innovation.  In short, this Article shows that 
competition was not the whole story of corporation law’s evolution. 
Yet, this Article also shows the inescapable effect of state 
competition.  The “modern” corporation laws that this era produced were 
ultimately less radical, and more similar to the laws of Delaware, than their 
Delaware Corporation Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (finding that the corporate bar 
in Delaware benefits most from Delaware’s dominant position in attracting incorporation). 
 10. Though it should be noted that some scholars now believe interstate competition is 
no longer the driver of corporation law.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 7, at 
554-55 (arguing Delaware’s position is too dominant to fall within interstate competition). 
 11. At the time observers clearly noticed that such a movement was underway.  See E. 
Merrick Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. 
L. REV. 27 (1936) (analyzing the development of corporation law in Massachusetts and 
Illinois over a fifty-year period); Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern 
Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 310-12 (1937) (finding that the prevailing 
trend among states was less regulation and more autonomy for the corporation).  See 
generally Modernization of Corporate Statutes:  A Symposium, 12 WISC. L. REV. 417 (1937) 
(explaining Wisconsin’s efforts in the mid-1930s to modernize its corporation law using 
other states’ modernization efforts as a model); Ray Garrett, Model Business Corporation 
Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 412, 415-18 (1951) (chronicling various states’ modernization 
efforts from 1927 to 1951). 
 12. There is one notable exception, which is now almost forty years old.  J. WILLARD 
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
1780-1970 70-76 (Univ. Press of Va. 1970).  Indeed, few legal historians have focused on 
modern corporations at all.  See Gregory A. Mark, The Corporate Economy:  Ideologies of 
Regulation and Antitrust, 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 
614, 646-50, 872-73 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2008). 
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drafters may have wished.  In some cases, states would not adopt reformist 
provisions out of fear that they would spark an exodus to a 
“chartermongering” state (sometimes explicitly identified as Delaware).  
This Article argues neither that these reform efforts were completely 
successful, nor that they were thwarted by the threat of Delaware’s 
competition; instead, this Article presents a more nuanced account in which 
reformers strove to produce shareholder-protective laws for corporations 
based in-state, while acutely aware that they labored in the shadow of 
Delaware. 
Part I of this Article reviews recent debates over the production of 
corporate law and identifies the specific corporate law debates to which the 
Article contributes.  Part II discusses the crucial developments that led to 
the movement to modernize state law, and focuses on both the changes in 
corporation law between the 1880s and 1920, and the changes in capital 
markets and share ownership in the 1920s that further convinced reformers 
of the need for new statutes.  Part III examines the motives behind states’ 
legal reforms and the ways that local reform efforts linked together within a 
loose national network for reform.  Part IV looks at specific statutory 
reforms, documents why states adopted them, and assesses the degree to 
which they succeeded.  Part V follows the reform movement into the 
1930s, and explains how the movement survived the federal government's 
intervention in corporation law reform through that decade’s federal 
securities acts. 
I. COMPETITION AND THE PRODUCTION OF CORPORATION LAW 
A bedrock assumption of corporate law scholarship is that states 
compete for charters, and that such competition propels the development of 
corporate law.13 This assumption lies at the heart of perhaps the most 
widely debated question in the field:  whether this competition has led 
states to offer laws that enhance shareholder value or merely enrich 
management.14  Commentators often sum up this inquiry as whether state 
competition produces a “race to the bottom” (i.e., a rush to adopt manager-
friendly laws that do not benefit shareholders), or a “race to the top” (i.e., 
states jockeying to provide corporation laws that enhance the value of a 
corporation and therefore benefit shareholders).15  Observers have 
recognized for over a hundred years that at least some states have changed 
 13. Although, a few iconoclastic scholars, such as those discussed supra note 3, 
recently challenged this assumption. 
 14. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 3, at 1794. 
 15. See generally McDonnell, supra note 1, at 103-09 (providing a useful overview of 
the debate over who benefits from state competition). 
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their corporation laws to attract out-of-state incorporators.16 
The modern debate, however, caught fire in the early 1970s with the 
publication of William Cary’s article, Federalism and Corporate Law:  
Reflections upon Delaware.17  The article restated a long-held belief of 
many corporation law critics:  that the need to compete for incorporations 
led Delaware to produce a corporation code that empowered managers 
(who had the power to choose where to incorporate) at the expense of 
shareholders (who did not) and that other states changed their laws in 
similar fashion to compete with Delaware.18  In the late 1970s, Ralph 
Winter challenged this belief when he argued that state law competition 
instead produced a race to the top.19  Because public corporations needed to 
raise funds in the capital markets, he reasoned, their managers could not 
afford to adopt a legal regime that disadvantaged shareholders, as this 
would drive up their costs of capital, lower share price, and invite a hostile 
takeover.20  Winter soon enlisted supporters in the fight; notably, Roberta 
Romano bolstered the claim that state competition tended to maximize 
shareholder value through a series of rigorous empirical studies of 
corporate valuation and the diffusion of corporate law innovations,21 while 
Daniel Fischel, and Frank Easterbrook promoted similar ideas in their work 
on the law and economics of corporation law.22  By the late 1990s, the new 
consensus was that state competition for charters produced a race to the 
 16. See, e.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 519, 542-43 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(setting out an early version of the “race to the bottom” argument). 
 17. Cary, supra note 8, at 663.  One observer believes that Delaware’s revision of its 
corporation law code in 1967 sparked the modern scholarly debate.  Lawrence Hamermesh, 
The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752-56 
(2006). 
 18. See Cary, supra note 8, at 665-66 (complaining that the Model Business 
Corporation Act was watered down in response to competition from Delaware). 
 19. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL ST. 251 (1977) (arguing that state corporation law sufficiently 
protects shareholder rights, constantly moves towards optimality, and remains a better 
option than federal regulation); Ralph K. Winter, The “Race to the Top” Revisited:  A 
Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528-29 (1989) (defending the position 
that state corporation law does not foster a “race to the bottom,” but rather produces 
efficient corporate regulation and shareholder protection). 
 20. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 15 (Foundation Press 
2002). 
 21. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:  Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265-73 (1985); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies 
of Corporate Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 945 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds. 2007). 
 22. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (Harv. Univ. Press 1996); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ 
Revisited:  Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. 
L. REV. 913 (1982). 
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top.23 
In recent years, other scholars have provided new takes on the theme 
of state competition and corporate law evolution.  Lucien Bebchuk and 
Assaf Hamdani, and Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, argue that 
contemporary state competition is overblown—in Kahan and Kamar’s 
word, a “myth.”24  While acknowledging that competition may once have 
propelled the development of corporation law, they assert that today 
Delaware reigns largely unopposed and other states lack any serious 
incentive to compete with it for charters.25  To the extent that states 
compete, they do so only for incorporations from firms already based in-
state;26 almost no state apart from Delaware still seeks to attract the 
incorporations of out-of-state firms.27  Other scholars have recast 
competition in other ways.  Mark Roe attempted to refocus the debate by 
claiming that, while other states no longer compete with Delaware, a sort of 
competition still occurs between Delaware and the federal government, 
given that the threat of federal intervention can always curb Delaware’s 
ability to provide corporation law.28  All of these contentions, however, are 
still contentious; Romano recently argued that states compete for 
corporation charters and cited as evidence the diffusion of innovative 
provisions in state corporation laws.29 
A different facet of the debate focuses on how states—particularly 
Delaware—craft their corporation laws, and which groups within states 
significantly influence the process.  In the first round of scholarship, race-
to-the-bottom scholars identified the beneficiaries of competition (and the 
villains of the piece) as Delaware and its citizens.30  Delaware produced 
manager-attractive corporation law, so the reasoning went, and in return 
 23. Subramanian, supra note 3, at 1799. 
 24. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 7, at 565-66 (noting that companies 
incorporate in states with large populations and big economies); Kahan & Kamar, supra 
note 7, at 684-85 (arguing that other than Delaware, states do not compete for companies to 
incorporate within their respective states). 
 25. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 724-25.  Notably, Kahan and Kamar take no 
position as to whether such competition occurred in the past. 
 26. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 7, at 568-72. 
 27. There is one interesting exception:  Nevada appears to compete with Delaware for 
close corporation incorporations.  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 716-17. 
 28. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591-92 (2003) 
(describing how the federal government can influence and even take away Delaware’s 
chartering business); see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 3, at 1794-95 (arguing that 
the federal government should take a more active role in corporate law matters); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2005) (examining the relationship between state and federal 
corporate lawmaking). 
 29. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory:  Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 210-11, 214 (2007). 
 30. Cary, supra note 8, at 664, 668-69. 
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received taxes from the corporations eager to incorporate there and take 
advantage of its laws.31  In the late 1980s, the work of Romano, and 
subsequently Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, revised and extended 
this account.32  As part of a larger project, each scholar identified specific 
groups as the “producers” of Delaware corporation law—in Macey and 
Miller’s words, “the interests within the state that stand to benefit . . . from 
the state's chartering system.”33  Macey and Miller identified the Delaware 
bar as the prime beneficiary of, and the in-state interest group best placed 
to promote, Delaware’s corporation-friendly law.34  Similarly, Lawrence 
Hamermesh’s fascinating “inside” account of the production of Delaware 
law identified the Delaware legislature and the State Bar Association as the 
makers of that state’s corporation code, and cited an “inherent 
conservatism”—not the desire for corporate revenues—as the lodestone of 
Delaware’s corporation lawmaking.35 
Despite the long debates, few scholars have taken a fine-grained look 
at the actual, historical process of state competition for incorporations, and 
the ways that particular states have crafted their corporation laws in 
response to competitive pressures.36  The most sweeping recent accounts of 
the evolution of corporation law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Herbert Hovenkamp’s Enterprise and American Law, 1836-
1937, and Morton J. Horowitz’s The Transformation of American Law, 
1870-1960, largely eschew detailed analysis of specific state innovations, 
and instead focus on more abstract legal and constitutional discourse 
concerning corporations.37  When scholars focus on competition and 
 31. Although Cary identified various groups, including the Delaware legislature and 
judiciary, that contributed to Delaware’s preeminence, he attributed the same goal to all of 
them:  “revenue for the state of Delaware.”  Id. at 668. 
 32. See generally Romano, supra note 21 (analyzing the factors that fostered 
Delaware’s preeminence in the reincorporation market); Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 
469-70 (examining the connection between Delaware’s revenues from incorporations and 
firms that take advantage of a favorable legal environment in Delaware). 
 33. Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 471. 
 34. See id. at 472-73, 509 (“[The] Delaware bar is able to prevail over rival groups in 
procuring favorable corporate law rules.”).  Both Romano’s and Miller and Macey’s 
accounts are broader than this discussion may indicate, as they also focus extensively on 
other aspects of Delaware’s legal system that make it an attractive legal home for out-of-
state corporations; but for the purposes of this Article, their identification of the Bar as a 
central interest group is most important. 
 35. Hamermesh, supra note 17, at 1752.  Hamermesh’s account focuses on Delaware 
law reformers’ current aims, and does not ask what goals the drafters of ninety years ago 
may have had. 
 36. As Gregory Mark notes, some race-to-the-bottom scholars dipped into the history of 
state competition for corporate charters, but race-to-the-top scholars avoided historical 
analysis altogether.  Mark, supra note 1, at 404. 
 37. MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 65-
107 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 
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corporation law, they chiefly look to the early era, when Delaware first 
gained preeminence.  Recently, the legal historian Charles Yablon took a 
new look at the birth of modern corporation laws in New Jersey, and the 
consequent competition between it and several other states that aimed to 
attract out-of-state incorporators between 1890 and 1915.38  Similarly, in 
his recent book, The Speculation Economy, Lawrence Mitchell examined 
the origins of New Jersey’s early dominance as a chartering state.39  A 
handful of other studies also examined the diffusion of corporation law 
innovations and incorporations later in the century.40 
Although illuminating, these historical studies highlight tremendous 
gaps that still exist in our knowledge of how state corporation laws 
developed and changed over time, and the role that various factors, 
including state competition, played in creating today’s corporate law 
regimes.  The abovementioned studies focus on the foundational era of 
modern corporation law, and understandably concentrate on the active 
competition for incorporations among Delaware, New Jersey, and 
competitor states in the years before 1920.41  What is missing are accounts 
of how the law evolved after Delaware leapt ahead of its competitors in the 
1910s, how the law evolved in states that did not compete nationally for 
corporate charters, and how changing social, economic, and political 
contexts—not just state competition—may have shaped its further 
development.  Among other things, this Article aims to fill those gaps, not 
merely to supplement the historical record, but to provoke reconsideration 
of standard accounts of the development of corporation law. 
1836-1937 11-64 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).  This is not to criticize either work, but just to 
point out that the authors did not purport to provide a detailed history of state law 
innovations. 
 38. Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 347-58 (2007). 
 39. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY:  HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED 
OVER INDUSTRY 30-56 (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2007). 
 40. Two studies deserve special note:  Roberta Romano’s examination of the diffusion 
of state corporation law innovations that began in the 1960s, Romano, supra note 29, at 209, 
and Bebchuk and Hamdani’s fascinating study showing that publicly traded corporations not 
legally domiciled in Delaware tend to distribute in different states.  Bebchuk & Hamdani, 
supra note 7, at 565-69. 
 41. Apart from the works by Yablon and Mitchell, discussions about early competition 
can be found in CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW (Garland Publ’g 1993); WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING 
CAPITAL:  THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 144-75 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 1997). 
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II. HISTORIES 
A. The Evolution of Corporation Law, 1880-1920 
The laws examined in this Article lay at the tail end of a forty-year 
process of legal reform.42  The nineteenth century had seen the rise of 
“general incorporation,” in which the early nineteenth-century requirement 
that each corporation receive a special charter from the legislature was 
replaced by a regime in which the state chartered any corporation that met 
fixed statutory requirements.43  Yet, the general incorporation rules did not 
provide incorporators with broad freedom to organize their enterprises in 
any way they pleased.  Before the 1890s, freedom of incorporation “meant 
only freedom to incorporate on rigidly restrictive provisions, not . . . 
freedom from restrictions in incorporation.”44  While general incorporation 
had made it easier to incorporate, corporations were still hemmed in by the 
laws that granted them their corporate status, and incorporators were not 
free to vary their corporation’s organization significantly from the model 
supplied by the state. 
In Massachusetts, to take one example, a corporation chartered before 
the turn of the twentieth century was limited in many ways.  It corporation 
could not have legal capital of more than $1,000,000, or less than $5,000.45  
Its capital had to be fully paid-in, and it had attest to that to the Secretary of 
the Commonwealth.46  Limited liability was limited; stockholders were 
personally liable for employees’ unpaid wages, and further “liable to 
creditors where debts were contracted before the stockholder had fully paid 
for his stock, where capital was reduced and repaid to stockholders, [or] 
where special stock had been created and had not been redeemed.”47  The 
 42. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 131-35, 390-400 (Simon 
& Schuster 3d ed. 2005) (summarizing changes in state corporation law in the nineteenth 
century); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 105-11 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1996) (discussing the 
constitutional cases that marked the liberalization of the corporation). 
 43. See generally Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility:  A 
Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 100-01 (1989) 
(discussing the shift to statutory requirements for incorporating firms). 
 44. Rutledge, supra note 11, at 306-07; see also HURST, supra note 12, at 76 (“The acts 
of the 1880s . . . retained traces of earlier distrust of the [corporate] device by continuing to 
insist that incorporators accept significant limitations of corporate structure.”). 
 45. Dodd, supra note 11, at 32 (citing 15 MASS. PUB. STAT. ch. 106, § 7 (1882)).  The 
law here applied to “mechanical, mining, and manufacturing business.”  Id.  Although Dodd 
explored the limits in Massachusetts’s statute, they were similar to restrictions that bound 
corporations in other states.  See generally WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND 
STOCKHOLDERS AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 2d ed. 1889) 
(surveying state laws from the 1880s). 
 46. Dodd, supra note 11, at 32. 
 47. Id. 
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corporation had to have a single, specific purpose set out in its charter,48 
and the law generally held corporate actions unconnected to that purpose 
void.49  Only unanimous shareholder consent could change a corporation’s 
purpose, which points to a second distinctive feature of nineteenth century 
corporation law:  not only did it constrain the corporation’s activities, but it 
also gave meaningful control to shareholders.  The Board’s power over the 
corporation was, in theory, limited to managing its day-to-day affairs.50  
Directors could not, for instance, absent shareholder approval, enter into a 
conveyance, mortgage, or long-term lease of real estate,51 authorize the 
issuance of new stock, or sell newly issued stock to whomever they wished, 
as the corporation had to first offer any new stock to existing shareholders 
in proportion to their current holdings.52 The limit on stock issuance also 
served as a brake on any effort by managers to expand the corporation.  
Nor could directors and officers sidestep shareholder supervision by 
receiving voting proxies from them, as the laws also limited the number of 
proxies a director or officer could vote at a shareholders’ meeting.53 
Massachusetts’s laws were typical of the late nineteenth century’s “set 
pattern incorporation acts.”54  But, while these acts may have been 
adequate for a time when most corporations were comparatively small, they 
raised problems toward the end of the century when technological and 
organizational developments gave birth to giant industrial enterprises.55  
The new enterprises were often created by the combination of several once-
independent companies, producing a pressing need to coordinate the 
operations of these companies through some centralized authority.56  At 
that time, however, corporation law did not allow most corporations to hold 
 48. The fundamental organizing document of a corporation is called either the charter 
or the articles of incorporation, depending on the state of incorporation.  This Article uses 
the term “charter.” 
 49. Dodd, supra note 11, at 33.  This is the ultra vires doctrine, which Part IV.E infra 
discusses in greater detail. 
 50. As a treatise of the time explained: 
The general authority of the directors of a corporation extends merely to the 
supervision and management of the company’s regular business.  A board of 
directors has no implied authority to make a material and permanent alteration 
of the business or constitution of a corporation, even though the alteration be 
within the company’s chartered powers. 
VICTOR MORAWETZ, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 512, at 479 
(Boston, Little Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1886). 
 51. Dodd, supra note 11, at 33. 
 52. Id.  Part IV.D, infra, discusses preemptive rights. 
 53. Dodd, supra note 11, at 33. 
 54. HURST, supra note 12, at 76. 
 55. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (Harv. Univ. Press 1977) (setting out the now-standard 
story of the growth of large-scale enterprise in the United States). 
 56. See id. at 323-32 (tracing the formation of six pioneering trusts in the 1880s). 
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stock in other corporations,57 and other arrangements that would have 
provided for centralized control, such as use of a “trust” as a holding entity, 
were open to legal challenge.58  As such, the new corporations strained at 
the limits of the laws’ set patterns. 
In 1889, New Jersey offered a way out for these new enterprises when 
it passed a new corporation law that explicitly permitted corporations to 
own shares of other corporations, and so instituted the modern era in 
corporation law.59  According to traditional accounts, this step was a move 
to lure corporations—or rather their incorporation business and 
accompanying fees—to New Jersey, and the gist of that account probably 
is correct.60  Recently, Charles Yablon has painted a more nuanced picture 
of the development and pointed out that, even before it changed its laws to 
accommodate holding companies, New Jersey modified other parts of its 
corporation law to provide an attractive legal home to out-of-state 
corporations.  As early as 1875, New Jersey amended its laws to allow 
corporations incorporated there to hold directors’ meetings out-of-state; a 
few years later, its courts adopted a rule particularly protective of directors 
who authorized the issuance of corporation stock in exchange for property, 
such as would occur in a corporation’s exchange of stock for another 
corporation’s assets in a merger.61  New Jersey soon became the preferred 
state of incorporation for large corporations, a development that profited 
 57. Id. at 323. 
 58. Challenges to corporations that participated in trusts were often based on a limiting 
feature of corporation law:  a corporation typically could not participate in a trust if its 
charter did not explicitly grant that power.  See Yablon, supra note 38, at 338-39 (discussing 
the legal challenges to trusts and the relevant role of corporation law). 
 59. Some challenge this date as the start of the modern era, and indeed, the best 
historian on the development of New Jersey’s laws has emphasized the degree to which the 
1889 legal reforms merely continued New Jersey’s pro-corporation legal policy.  Id.  
Notwithstanding, the opening of New Jersey to holding companies marks a departure from 
nineteenth century conceptions of corporation law. 
 60. The claim that New Jersey adopted liberalized corporation laws to attract out-of-
state firms to incorporate, and thus pay the state fees, became a staple of Progressive attacks 
on corporations.  See Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey:  A Traitor State, MCCLURE’S MAG., 
Apr. 1905, at 649 (arguing that New Jersey passed incorporation acts that other states would 
not pass, simply to raise revenue); see also RON CHERNOW, TITAN:  THE LIFE OF JOHN D. 
ROCKEFELLER, SR. 332 (Random House 1998) (explaining that Standard Oil executives 
noticed New Jersey’s law).  See generally MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 34-42 (providing a 
more general background on New Jersey’s long history of favoring business interests). 
 61. Yablon, supra note 38, at 334.  As Yablon observes, New Jersey became popular 
for incorporations not only because it legitimized the holding company, but also because its 
combined legal provisions “added flexibility to any firm or promoter engaged in negotiating 
the complex mergers and consolidations that were becoming increasingly popular in the 
1890s.”  Id. at 343; see Jonathan Chausovsky, State Regulation of Corporations in the Late 
Nineteenth Century:  A Critique of the New Jersey Thesis, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 30, 37 
(2007) (arguing that New Jersey “did not start the ‘race to the bottom;’ rather, the state won 
a race already underway”). 
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the state greatly, as the inrush of corporation taxes and franchise fees 
allowed it to eliminate its state property tax.62  Thus, New Jersey won the 
first competition for charters. 
Revisions that New Jersey made to its laws in 1896 give us a window 
into what large corporations found most attractive in corporation law.63  
Out of a welter of specific provisions, two themes stand out:  the new law 
removed many limits formerly imposed on corporations, and vastly 
increased incorporators’ and directors’ powers relative to shareholders to 
craft the internal organization of a corporation.  The 1896 act provided that 
a corporate charter could include “any provision for the regulation of the 
business and the conduct of the affairs of the corporation.”64  Two years 
later, the legislature further amended the act to allow provisions “creating, 
defining, limiting and regulating the power of the corporation.”65 
The new statutes also lessened shareholder power by removing 
unanimity requirements for major corporate transactions.  New Jersey’s 
revisions gave incorporators greater power to amend the corporate charter 
and issue new kinds of securities, with approval of only a set majority of 
shareholders.66  This was one example of a larger shift during this era; 
corporation law—beginning with New Jersey’s and Delaware’s—replaced 
the requirement for unanimous shareholder approval of mergers with one 
that provided for mere majority approval, and instead gave dissenting 
shareholders the right to demand an appraisal and purchase of their 
shares.67  As Yale’s Bayless Manning noted half a century ago, while the 
replacement of unanimity with an appraisal right was sold as a protection 
for minority shareholders, it also had the effect of “giving greater mobility 
of action to the majority—that is, to corporate management speaking in the 
name of the majority.”68 
 62. See GRANDY, supra note 41, at 45, 49-50, tbls. 3.4-3.5 (tracing the rise in New 
Jersey corporation receipts).  New Jersey Governor Leon Abbett, in his 1893 message to the 
legislature, gave revenue from corporations “credit for dispensing with the state property 
tax.  He attributed this solely to liberal corporation policy of the state.”  Id. at 45; see also 
MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 38-42 (describing how New Jersey hit on the incorporation 
business as a way to earn money). 
 63. Yablon, supra note 38, at 349-53; see also GRANDY, supra note 41, at 43-45 (noting 
that the new laws liberalized merger and stockholding authority). 
 64. Yablon, supra note 38, at 352 (citing 1896 N.J. LAWS 280). 
 65. Id. (citing 1896 N.J. LAWS 408). 
 66. Id.  New Jersey’s revision here responded to a similar provision in New York law.  
Id. 
 67. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy:  An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 221, 226 (1962) (noting the appraisal remedy as a statutory remedy 
across all states).  See generally Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule:  
Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-20 (1995) (discussing the 
shareholders’ remedy). 
 68. Manning, supra note 67, at 227. 
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As other states moved to compete with New Jersey, a slow process 
was set into motion that would replace the restrictive set-pattern acts of the 
1880s with the liberal and flexible “enabling” corporation statutes that 
characterized the twentieth century.69  Delaware, Maine, South Dakota, and 
West Virginia all soon altered their corporation laws to attract out-of-state 
incorporators, and even entered into agreements with corporation services 
companies to advertise nationally the easy virtues of their corporation 
statutes.70  In response, other states such as Massachusetts and New York 
liberalized their own corporation laws, not to attract out-of-state 
incorporators, but simply to discourage firms already based in-state from 
incorporating elsewhere.71  Of the states that competed with New Jersey, 
Delaware proved the most successful, and after the turn of the century it 
also began to attract significant incorporation business.72  Its eventual 
preeminence was guaranteed when, in 1913, New Jersey’s new reformist 
governor, Woodrow Wilson, persuaded the state legislature to adopt the so-
called “Seven Sisters” provisions to its corporation act, which tightened 
state limits on corporations and helped destroy New Jersey’s image as a 
safe location for incorporations.73 
By the beginning of the 1920s, the legal landscape of corporation law 
had been transformed by the competition for corporate charters.  A rough 
division can be drawn between the few states with corporation laws highly 
favorable to corporations, preeminently Delaware, and many others with 
laws that were perceived as at best adequate.74  Although many of these 
 69. Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 519, 542-43 (1933), 
famously summarizes this process.  As Yablon points out, the competition was broad-based 
and involved not just a liberalized corporation law, but cutting taxes and incorporation fees.  
Yablon, supra note 38, at 359.  Delaware eventually reversed this trend; today, its corporate 
law product is so desirable that corporations pay a premium to incorporate there. 
 70. See MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 40-42 (providing an entertaining account of New 
Jersey’s collaboration with the Corporation Trust Company); see also Yablon, supra note 
38, at 347-49 (discussing the organization of the Corporation Trust Company of New 
Jersey). 
 71. Yablon, supra note 38, at 358-59.  New York, for instance, repealed its requirement 
for an annual report and lowered its incorporation fees, in a successful attempt to persuade 
many corporations with operations in that state to incorporate there.  Id. at 364. 
 72. Id. at 361. 
 73. Yablon points out that Delaware’s victory was a slow one; most New Jersey 
corporations did not immediately reincorporate in Delaware, and Delaware emerged as the 
favored home for large corporations only over time.  Id. at 325 n.10; see also Mark, supra 
note 12, at 625-27 (summarizing Delaware’s eventual dominance of the incorporation 
market and explaining why it proved attractive to many corporations).  One promoter wrote 
in 1922 that over 40% of the capital that business corporations in the United States 
employed came from corporations organized in Delaware, New Jersey, New York, or 
Pennsylvania.  JOHN S. PARKER, WHERE AND HOW:  A CORPORATION HAND BOOK vii 
(Broun-Green Co. 6th ed. 1922). 
 74. See infra Part IV (discussing changes in the modernized laws). 
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states had certainly amended their corporation laws since the late 
nineteenth century, laws that had not been thoroughly updated for decades 
still helped make these states less attractive as a legal home for 
corporations.75  These conditions, as well as changes in business and the 
corporate economy that the next section discusses, created fertile ground 
for legal reform efforts that began in the subsequent decade. 
B. Corporations in the 1920s 
During the 1920s, many states moved to update their corporation laws 
in response not only to the challenges posed by Delaware and other 
“chartermongering” states, but also to pressures generated by national 
developments in economics and finance.  Indeed, the changes in the laws, 
and the pressures that gave rise to them, cannot be understood apart from 
larger developments that characterized the decade. 
In retrospect, the 1920s appeared an economic golden age.  After the 
sharp but brief recession of 1920-1921, the American economy entered 
seven years of sustained economic growth and almost doubled industrial 
production.76  A series of new technologies, and the rapid and visible 
spread of the automobile, telephone, electrical, and radio industries 
convinced many that the United States had entered a “new era” of sustained 
economic growth.77  As the economy heated up, older debates cooled; after 
decades of battle over the role of corporations in society, most Americans 
appeared to accept, or at least acquiesce to, the dominant role that giant 
corporations played in the economy.78 
Not only did most Americans accept corporations’ new role, many 
also took on new roles themselves as investors in those corporations.  For 
the first time, significant numbers of ordinary, or at least non-wealthy, 
investors entered the stock market.  Contrary to popular accounts, not 
everyone plunged into Wall Street; even at the end of the decade, probably 
no more than two million Americans actively invested in the stock market, 
 75. Id. 
 76. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932 179 (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1993). 
 77. MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY:  PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 76-85 (Harv. Univ. Press 1990). 
 78. See id. at 89 (“It was in the 1920s that the modern corporate economy, dominated 
by large, publicly financed companies servicing a massive consumer market, came of age.”).  
“Most” does not mean “all”; some Americans continue to challenge the large corporation’s 
role.  See, e.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 519, 541-43 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(expressing wariness towards the growing size and power of modern corporations); Robert 
C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the 
Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1022-28 (2005) (discussing 
the anti-chain store movement). 
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and probably “75 percent of the dollar value of all outstanding securities 
were held by not much more than half a million people.”79  Even this, 
however, was many more investors than before World War I, when stocks 
of all kinds had been perceived as highly speculative investments. 
The War itself was one reason for the change, as it produced a 
sophisticated sales campaign that persuaded millions of Americans to place 
their savings in government-sponsored “Liberty Bonds.”80  From wartime 
Liberty Bonds, it was only a small step for postwar investors to begin 
purchasing corporate bonds, preferred shares, and even comparatively risky 
common stocks, a step aided by popular economics writers and 
businessmen who contended that purchasing stocks was no longer a risky 
“speculation” but instead a prudent “investment.”81 
As the number of securities buyers increased, so did the mix of 
securities that they bought.  In 1922, the first year of the boom, securities 
issuances were overwhelmingly bonds; that year $2,329,000,000 in bonds 
were issued, compared to $333,000,000 in preferred shares and only 
$288,000,000 in common stock.82  Seven years later, the numbers reflected 
the change in securities markets.  In 1929, $2,620,000,000 in bonds were 
issued, but so were $1,565,000,000 in preferred shares, and an astonishing 
$5,062,000,000 in common stock.83  Moreover, as investors bought more 
securities, they also bought new kinds of securities.  According to one 
practitioner, the post-war years saw the sudden “development of such novel 
instruments of finance as non-par stock, non-voting and management stock, 
participating preferred stock, stock purchase warrants and convertible 
bonds, bankers’ control, and holding and subsidiary corporations.”84  The 
proliferation of these new products offered investors new opportunities, but 
also untested choices.  For example, investors who wished to keep their 
main investments in comparatively safe securities, but did not want to miss 
 79. STEVEN FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR:  A HISTORY OF WALL STREET IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 391 (Harper Collins 2005).  When “passive holders of securities in pension 
funds, corporate stock ownership plans, and so on” are included, however, as many as 
fourteen million could be numbered as Wall Street investors.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 350-51. 
 81. See VINCENT CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA:  A HISTORY 285 (Harv. 
Univ. Press 1970) (discussing the campaigns to encourage investment in common stocks). 
 82. 3 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:  FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT MILLENNIAL EDITION 3-766, tbl. Cj831-837 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Joseph V. Kline, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance, 42 HARV. L. REV. 714, 
714 (1928) (reviewing A. A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928)).  
Kline may have exaggerated the novelty of some of these innovations—for instance, 
railroad financing used convertible bonds in the mid-nineteenth century.  ARTHUR STONE 
DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 117 (Ronald Press Co. 3d ed. 1934).  
But, Kline’s comment points out the spectacular growth and spread of these instruments in 
the 1920s. 
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out on the potential upside offered by common stock, could purchase bonds 
or preferred shares convertible into common stock, or which came with 
attached option warrants that allowed later purchase of common shares at a 
preset price.85  Investors who wished to purchase common stocks directly 
still had to select among different classes of common stock with different 
financial and voting rights.86 
For some, the influx of neophyte investors and the general growth of 
bafflingly complex securities and capital structures signaled a more 
fundamental development:  the growing separation of ownership and 
control in large corporations.  Although many scholars date the discovery 
of the “separation of ownership and control” to A. A. Berle and Gardner 
Means’s seminal 1932 work, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, others circulated similar ideas in the 1920s.87  As early as 1914, 
the journalist Walter Lippmann wrote that “[t]he real news about business 
is that it is being administered by men who are not profiteers.  The 
managers are on salary, divorced from ownership and from bargaining.”88 
Harvard economist William Z. Ripley lodged the idea in the public 
consciousness in 1926 when he published his best-selling critique of 
corporate finance and law, Main Street and Wall Street.89  Although Ripley 
directed much of his ire at the proliferation of non-voting common stock, a 
device which really did free managers from shareholders’ control, his 
central claim was more generally that developments in corporate law had 
given managers the ability to manipulate a corporation free of shareholder 
involvement.90  His complaint had at least two important prongs:  that the 
rising number and dispersion of shareholders, particularly retail investors, 
made it more difficult for them to govern or supervise the corporation,91 
 85. Isador Grossman, Some Modern Trends in Industrial Corporation Financing, 15 
A.B.A. J. 127, 130 (1929). 
 86. See id.; see also Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights:  
The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 694 (1986) 
(noting two examples of leading corporations that provided common stock); W. H. S. 
Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q. J. EC. 
353 (1926) (providing a quantitative measure of changing securities offerings in the 1920s). 
 87. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (MacMillan Co. 1932). 
 88. WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY (Univ. of Wis. Press 1914) (quoted in 
THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION:  CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED M. KAHN 141 (Belknap Press 1983)). 
 89. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (Kessinger Publ’g 1926). 
 90. See Seligman, supra note 86, at 693-99 (explaining that Ripley waged a dramatic 
war on non-voting common stock, which the New York Stock Exchange prohibited in 
1927). 
 91. Ripley did not wish for shareholders to directly engage in management; as he put it, 
“expectation of a general active participation by the whole body of shareholders is bound to 
go wrong from the crossing of the wire.”  RIPLEY, supra note 89, at 129.  Rather, Ripley 
sought some mechanism to attain “the desired end of a reasonable check and balance upon 
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and that recent changes to corporation law similarly stripped shareholders 
of controls they once wielded within the corporation.92  His charges were at 
times scattershot; Main Street and Wall Street leaves the reader with the 
impression that corporation law largely is a plot against the shareholder.  
But, Ripley’s basic complaint is clear:  that the legal and ownership 
changes of the 1920s created a situation in which “ownership and control 
had parted company, each going its own way as ships that pass in the 
night[.]”93  Shadowing many of the specific legal developments that this 
Article discusses, then, was a growing sense that shareholders, the legal 
owners of corporations, were losing out to those who were supposed to 
manage the corporation on their behalf. 
III. CHANGING CORPORATION LAW 
Beginning in the mid-1920s, a series of states, including those that 
dominated the nation’s industrial heartland, either substantially revised or 
completely replaced their existing corporation laws.  While states often 
adjusted their corporation laws throughout the previous two decades,94 
observers at the time identified the wave of changes that began in the mid-
1920s as a new phenomenon, a true movement to produce a coherent set of 
corporation codes to replace fragmented and outmoded frameworks for 
regulating corporations.  Wiley Rutledge, later a Supreme Court Justice but 
then still a corporate law scholar, identified “[t]he climax of the movement 
. . . in the comparatively recent adoption of so-called ‘modern’ or ‘liberal’ 
incorporation laws in such old-time ‘conservative’ states as California, 
Illinois, Indiana, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington.”95  These states, he predicted, were 
“merely the vanguard of a procession which will grow longer and longer 
until perhaps the entire country will be included.”96  This Article focuses 
management.”  Id. at 130. 
 92. Ripley actually hated a host of corporation law reforms, some discussed infra Part 
IV.  See id. at 29-54 (surveying the state-by-state reforms). 
 93. Id. at 117. 
 94. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Recent Legislation:  Legislative Developments in 
Corporation Law, 15 CAL. L. REV. 421, 422 (1927) (clarifying that not all states stood still 
before this; in the early and mid-1920s, for instance, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and 
Michigan rewrote their corporation acts).  None of these changes, however, yielded 
thoroughgoing “modern” incorporation acts of the kind produced later that decade. 
 95. Rutledge, supra note 11, at 309; see also Ballantine, supra note 94, at 422 
(discussing the modernized laws of several states, especially Ohio); Garrett, supra note 11, 
at 412 (noting the development of corporation laws); Floyd A. Wright & Victor Baughman, 
Past and Present Trends in Corporation Law:  Is Florida in Step?, 11 MIAMI L.Q. 69, 98 
(1947) (speaking of a “new era of modernized codification [that] got underway in the late 
twenties”). 
 96. Rutledge, supra note 11, at 309. 
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on these changes, as they constitute a sustained response to both the 
economic and social developments just sketched out and the previous 
decades’ competition for corporation charters.  This Part of the Article 
discusses states’ motives and methods to modernize corporation laws, 
while the next Part focuses on several of the most important provisions of 
the acts them
A. The Challenge of Competition and Motives for Innovation 
While each state had its own reasons for a new corporation statute, 
one reason was advanced across the board:  the threat of Delaware and 
other “chartermongering” states.97  Specifically, chartermongering states 
threatened to lure corporations to incorporate in them, rather than in the 
states where they were located.  The modernizing states’ goal, in contrast, 
was not to attract the incorporations of corporations located elsewhere, but 
simply to persuade corporations based in-state to incorporate there as well.  
A drafter of Ohio’s new corporation act explained that one reason for his 
state’s new law was that previously “many, if not most, of the large 
industrial corporations of Ohio [were] organized under the laws of other 
states.”98  Minnesota’s reasons were similar; before the adoption of a new 
act in 1933, “many attorneys . . . felt compelled to use the laws of other 
states for purposes of incorporation.”99 When Illinois introduced its new 
corporation law to the legislature in 1931, its sponsor justified the law by 
noting that under the old law “[m]embers of the bar too often have found it 
necessary to advise their clients to incorporate under the laws of other 
states, to avoid inadequate and burdensome provisions.”100 
California particularly illustrates why states wished to retain in-state 
incorporations.  Henry Ballantine, the father of California’s new act, 
asserted that the law’s main purpose was to “obviate the need to resort to 
other states for the incorporation of California enterprises.”101  The 
legislature also presented this claim to California’s voters in 1929 when it 
asked them to approve a constitutional change to give corporations limited 
liability as part of California’s corporation reforms.  “Thousands of 
 97. “Chartermongering” appeared to be the preferred pejorative for states that aimed to 
attract out-of-state incorporators.  See, e.g., RIPLEY, supra note 89, at 30 (“The little state of 
Delaware has always been forward in this chartermongering business.”). 
 98. Elwyn G. Davies, Reflections of the Amateur Draftsmen of the Ohio General 
Corporation Act, 12 WISC. L. REV. 487, 487 (1937). 
 99. P. L. Solether & Edward G. Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, 12 
WISC. L. REV. 419, 419 (1937). 
 100. Arthur Evans, Offers Revised Illinois Law on Corporations, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 
1931, at 7 (quoting State Sen. A.B. Huebsch). 
 101. Henry W. Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 
19 CAL. L. REV. 465, 466 (1931). 
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corporations, organized by California citizens to transact business in 
California,” read the ballot statement that accompanied the amendment 
proposal, “incorporate under the laws of other states, because they can not 
obtain reasonable corporate facilities at home.”102  Certainly, both 
economic and political reasons abounded for keeping corporations 
incorporated “at home”; income from franchise and corporate taxes was 
one, the desire to maintain some control over local corporations another.  
Yet, less pecuniary reasons also propelled the new laws; Ballantine spoke 
at one point of the “humiliation” of California-based corporations resorting 
to Nevada and Delaware for incorporation.103 
These were the stated motives for the new acts, but were they also the 
real ones?  At least one scholar who examined the development of 
California’s law voiced skepticism, noted that there was no upsurge in 
California incorporations after it passed the new law, which one would 
expect if the drafters really designed the law to lure back incorporations.104  
His evidence also shows, however, that among the backers of the changes 
to California’s laws were several large law firms, which had been 
compelled in the 1920s to recommend that some large corporate clients 
reincorporate in Delaware.  This supports the hypothesis that competition 
with Delaware was a major motive for reform.105 
A remarkable study that Wisconsin commissioned as part of its 
statutory revision process further supports the conclusions that the new 
statutes were attempts to retain the incorporations of in-state firms, and not 
attempts to enter into the national competition for charters.  In 1933, a 
University of Wisconsin Law School doctoral fellow, John Shiels, wrote a 
thesis examining Wisconsin-based firms that chose to incorporate 
elsewhere and produced a comprehensive study to identify exactly why 
many large Wisconsin firms preferred other states’ legal regimes.106  Shiels 
 102. Argument Printed on the Ballot in Support of C.A. Const. art. XII, amend., reprinted 
in HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 2 (Parker, Stone & 
Baird Co. 1932). 
 103. Henry W. Ballantine, Recent Legislation:  Changes in the California Corporation 
Laws, 17 CAL. L. REV. 529, 530 (1929) (explaining California’s humiliation as it helplessly 
observed other states provide their citizens with the resources to invest capital and organize 
business). 
 104. Mark I. Weinstein, Limited Liability in California, 1928-1931:  It’s the Lawyers, 7 
AM. L. & EC. REV. 439, 457 (2001) (suggesting that the robust nature of California’s 
economy best explains the increase in incorporations within that state). 
 105. See id. at 475 (noting that, in the 1920s, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher recommended to 
certain clients that they reincorporate in Delaware); id. at 478 (maintaining that some 
backers of the new law were attracted to the idea of having an up-to-date law, while for 
others, “modernity per se was an issue”).  This parallels Macey and Miller’s account of the 
Delaware bar’s role in making that state attractive to corporations.  Macey & Miller, supra 
note 9, at 471-74. 
 106. John Hofstatter Shiels summarizes this study in Why do Wisconsin Concerns 
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reviewed these corporations’ charters to determine which aspects of the 
incorporating state’s laws the charters specifically included, and were thus 
presumably important to the corporation.107 
Shiels concluded that no single element of Delaware’s law made it 
preferable to Wisconsin’s; rather, a host of provisions attracted the firms.108  
Apart from the fact that Delaware had lower incorporation fees than 
Wisconsin,109 Shiels identified a number of attractive provisions, including 
that Delaware law allowed a corporation to gain limited liability upon 
incorporation, while Wisconsin required a corporation to show a certain 
amount of paid-in capital first;110 Delaware’s statute expressly provided for 
mergers and consolidations, where Wisconsin’s was silent;111 and Delaware 
law allowed boards of directors to delegate functions to committees.112  A 
particularly noticeable difference was that Delaware gave directors far 
greater powers to amend a corporation’s charter and by-laws than did 
Wisconsin.113  The report noted that, unlike in Wisconsin, the Board of a 
Delaware corporation could, with majority shareholder concurrence, make 
“fundamental alterations in the purposes and objects of a corporation,” and 
could, with appropriate shareholder approval, alter “the relative 
preferences, participations, limitations, and rights” of classes of stock, 
something impossible under Wisconsin law.114  In sum, the study revealed 
the concrete ways in which Delaware law was more flexible than 
Incorporate in Other States?, 11 WISC. L. REV. 457 (1936) (examining a list of 163 “foreign 
corporations” doing business in Wisconsin, and concluding that 120 qualified under his 
criteria as “Wisconsin concerns organized under the laws of other states”).  See also John 
Hofstatter Shiels, A Factual and Legal Study of the Foreign Incorporation of Wisconsin 
Concerns (1934) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin) (on file with author). 
 107. See Shiels, Why do Wisconsin Concerns Incorporate in Other States?, supra note 
106, at 458 (revealing that out of the 120 corporations incorporated elsewhere, eighty-four 
incorporated in Delaware, eleven in Minnesota, ten in Illinois, four in Michigan, and the 
remainder scattered among nine other states).  As far as the size of corporations, Shiels 
found that larger firms—defined as those worth more than $1 million—tended to 
incorporate out-of-state, while a much lower percentage of small firms did so.  Id. at 459-60.  
The comparatively high number of Illinois and Minnesota incorporations suggests limited 
competition for corporate charters between these states, perhaps because in an era of less 
rapid transport it was more convenient for some Wisconsin firms to incorporate in 
Springfield or St. Paul, rather than Wilmington. 
 108. Shiels examined the charters of the Wisconsin-based, Delaware-chartered firms to 
see which provisions of Delaware’s law they adopted (many of Delaware’s provisions were 
elective).  This examination, however, failed to capture other reasons why corporations 
preferred Delaware, most notably a preference for Delaware’s allegedly pro-management 
courts. 
 109. Id. at 461. 
 110. Id. at 465. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 466. 
 113. Id. at 468-69. 
 114. Id. at 468. 
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Wisconsin’s, and showed that other states’ need to compete with Delaware 
provided a major impetus for legal change.115 
Ascribing these changes solely to the need to compete with Delaware 
misses, however, another important element of the new state laws:  the 
degree to which drafters explicitly designed them not to duplicate those of 
Delaware.  In broad outline, these acts often followed and even borrowed 
provisions from Delaware’s acts, which, as just noted, provided 
incorporators great leeway to frame the corporation as they wished, and 
acknowledged the need for greater managerial autonomy and less 
shareholder involvement in the day-to-day workings of the corporation.116  
Yet, the new laws’ drafters clearly did not wish them to duplicate those of 
the chartermongering states.  According to Ballantine, the California act’s 
main purpose was to make it unnecessary for “California enterprises” to 
incorporate elsewhere.117  Ohio’s new law aimed only to check “the 
migration of corporate enterprises from that state,” and did not seek to 
place Ohio “among the states that make a specialty of issuing charters to 
enterprises doing business elsewhere.”118  Other states were even blunter:  
“Minnesota has no desire to become a chartermongering state.”119  The 
purpose of Illinois’s act, according to its sponsor, was not “merely to 
increase the revenue of the state”–—perhaps an implied rebuke to 
Delaware.120 
Drafters of the new acts claimed that their acts would differ sharply 
from those of the competitive states by providing substantial protections to 
shareholders.  California’s law, for instance, aimed to be: 
[L]iberal enough to facilitate business transactions without undue 
formalities of checks and balances, of votes and consents of 
shareholders, and applications to courts, and at the same time not 
so lax that the management or the majority may manipulate the 
machinery to the prejudice of creditors or investors or the 
 115. This is not a comprehensive list of all the ways that Delaware corporation law was 
more attractive than Wisconsin’s.  See generally id. (providing a more comprehensive 
analysis). 
 116. In 1933, a professor of law at the University of Illinois, discussing the new 
corporation statutes, wrote that the “models of these laws have, in general, been the 
Delaware law, which in a general way, is the model for the new law of Illinois.”  Sveinbjorn 
Johnson, Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends in Corporation Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 631, 633 
(1933).  He was to some extent correct; many of these laws borrowed provisions from 
Delaware.  See Garrett, supra note 11, at 418-19 (noting that many states modernized their 
acts based in part on the Delaware model).  Although Johnson may have meant that the 
broad outlines of the corporation acts and their liberalizing tendencies followed Delaware’s, 
the laws did not follow Delaware’s in every important respect. 
 117. Ballantine, supra note 101, at 466. 
 118. Paul J. Bickel, Ohio’s New Corporation Law, 15 GEO. L.J. 409, 424-25 (1927). 
 119. Solether & Jennings, supra note 99, at 423. 
 120. Evans, supra note 100, at 7. 
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oppression of minority shareholders.121 
Illinois’s law promised to protect shareholders from ongoing abuses 
and to simplify the state’s complex corporation code.122  Even discounting 
such statements as self-serving, they indicate that the new acts marked out 
shareholder protection as a particularly important difference between the 
enacting state’s laws and Delaware’s.  A few years later, Harvard’s Merrick 
Dodd reviewed developments of the past decades and noted that, while the 
long-term trend in corporation law was to “grant extremely broad powers to 
the management or to the management when supported by vote of the 
majority of the shareholders[,]” some of the more recent corporate acts 
provided restrictions “definitely designed for the protection of investors or 
creditors.”123 
The new laws, then, were the product of complex and not always 
harmonious motives.  Their drafters clearly did not want simply to copy 
statutes from Delaware and other chartermongering states, as they believed 
those corporate codes insufficiently protected shareholders and creditors.  
Nevertheless, the need to retain corporations and to provide managers with 
flexibility pushed the acts towards Delaware’s model.  After all, if the new 
laws were too shareholder-friendly or insufficiently flexible, they would 
not be able to persuade local corporations to incorporate in-state.  As 
Ballantine wrote, “[i]t is perfectly useless to impose drastic limitations and 
requirements that will simply have the effect of driving corporations from 
their home states to more hospitable shores.”124 
 121. Ballantine, supra note 101, at 465. 
 122. Thomas Furlong, Illinois Plans Better Law on Corporations:  New Act Proposed to 
Protect Investor, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1933, at A9; New Corporate Act to Reform Illinois 
Code:  Clarifies Law, Safeguards Investor, CHI. TRIB. June 9, 1933, at 29. 
 123. E. Merrick Dodd, American Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and 
Today, in 3 LAW:  A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 254, 275-76 (Alison Reppy ed., 1937). 
 124. Ballantine, supra note 101, at 465.  At least one other record reveals that drafters 
were aware that an overly-restrictive statute would drive corporations to reincorporate out of 
state.  The 1924 meeting of the NCCUSL considered the ninth draft of the Uniform 
Incorporation Act.  One commissioner, Ryall of Michigan, noted the popularity of Delaware 
and New Jersey, and then objected to a provision on the grounds that its inclusion in the Act 
would allow “two or three [states to] capitalize on the strictness of this act and deliberately 
pass a more liberal one and undo just exactly the situation we are trying to accomplish.”  
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 
230 (1924). 
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B. Networks of Reform 
These new acts were more than the work of state-level interest groups.  
Previous accounts have typically identified in-state interest groups as the 
main movers behind such corporation law reforms, particularly state bar 
associations whose members stood to benefit most directly from reforms.125  
Certainly, such groups were necessary for corporation law reform.  The 
account presented in this Article, however, broadens these accounts of 
corporation lawmaking by identifying two other sources for the era’s 
reforms. 
First, it points to the growth of a network to reform state corporation 
laws that slowly developed in the late 1920s and 1930s.126  This network 
can be traced to the lawyers in the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), who developed the proposed 
Uniform Business Corporation Act (“UBCA”) in the 1920s, at times in 
conjunction with a few corporate law critics of the period, notably the then-
law professor A. A. Berle.127  As states began to revise their corporation 
laws, they drew on the UBCA and other states’ reformist acts, which 
fostered a network that shared reform ideas and model statutory provisions.  
For instance, the NCCUSL drafted the UBCA in the mid-1920s, and the 
revisers of Ohio’s corporation act (aided by Berle) relied upon a draft 
version of it in 1927.  States following after could then draw on both the 
UBCA and Ohio’s example, and so on.128  State-level legal reforms were 
therefore a product of more than state-level influences, and the consequent 
movement for corporation law reform truly was a national one. 
Second, this Article shows how in-state legal change was more than 
just the product of an undifferentiated “state bar.”  While state bar 
associations were prime movers in many corporate law reform efforts, in 
order to win support for proposed legal reforms they had to engage in 
extensive coalition-building to secure support for the new laws, carefully 
 125. See supra Part I (discussing the origins of corporate law reform). 
 126. The national dimension is important because depicting the revised laws as chiefly 
the product of particular state-level pressures misunderstands their genesis and import.  This 
is the one flaw to an otherwise excellent account, for instance, of California’s corporation 
law reform in 1931.  See Weinstein, supra note 104, at 439 (discussing the state-level 
pressures and their impact on the modernization of California’s law). 
 127. The account in this Article thus points forward to later reform efforts that attempted 
to sway state-level corporation reform through national organizations, such as the 
development of the Model Business Corporation Act beginning in the 1940s, or the 
American Law Institute’s development of its Principles of Corporate Governance in the 
1990s. 
 128. The influences were highly eclectic and not uniform; for instance, while some states 
relied heavily on the UBCA as a model, not all did. 
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developing laws that would attract support from both big-city and small-
town lawyers, and to vet the new laws with accounting and other 
professional groups to ensure broad support.  In sum, this section sets out a 
richer account of the development of corporation law than previously 
offered. 
Movements to reform corporation law have a long history.  National 
law reform, including proposals for a single federal corporation law, 
appeared on the agenda by the end of the nineteenth century.129  Supporters 
had long floated proposals to revise state corporation laws; at the turn of 
the twentieth century, two New York corporation lawyers proposed a 
(never enacted) Model Business Corporation act.130  In the late 1920s, the 
American Law Institute produced a tentative Restatement of the Law of 
Business Associations.131 
The most influential of these reform projects began in 1903 when the 
NCCUSL began work on what eventually became the UBCA, a project that 
later won support from the American Bar Association.132  The NCCUSL 
was born out of the first push for uniform commercial acts in the late 
nineteenth century, and it spent much of the early twentieth century 
producing model acts to cover commercial areas from bills of lading to 
warehouse receipts.133  Despite its early start, consensus eluded the project 
to produce a uniform corporation act, and the NCCUSL did not finally 
promulgate a version until its tenth draft was accepted in 1928.134 
The NCCUSL clearly designed the UBCA as an alternative to the 
 129. See KELLER, supra note 77, at 88-89 (examining proponents of a national 
corporation law). 
 130. Id. at 88. 
 131. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (A.L.I., Tentative Draft No. 
1 1928) (reflecting the American Law Institute’s concern with uniform business laws in 
1928); see HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAW (1928) (reflecting the National Conference of Commissioners’ concern with 
corporation law); Uniform Business Corporation Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 5 
WASH. L. REV. 170, 170 (1931) (explaining that “a uniform business corporation act . . . was 
approved and recommended for adoption at the meeting of the [1928 National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Law]”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Overview of the 
Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1271, 1272 (1993) (summarizing the 
history of reform projects). 
 132. At least one state cited ABA support as important in its eventual reliance on the 
UBCA.  See Chicago Bar Association, Corporation Law Committee, Memorandum re A Bill 
for an Act to Revise the Law Relating to Corporations for Pecuniary Profit, to be known as 
the “Business Corporation Act” 44, 72 (1933).  Previous accounts downplay the influence 
of the UBCA, but this account suggests that the UBCA’s influence was greater than might 
be detected from a list of states that adopted it. 
 133. KELLER, supra note 77, at 95-96. 
 134. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 78 (1928); Robert S. 
Stevens, Stock Issues Under the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 
399 (1927). 
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corporation laws offered by chartermongering states.135  The NCCUSL’s 
drafting committee introduced its tentative Uniform Incorporation Act (as it 
was then called) in 1924 by identifying three approaches to corporation 
statutes:  those “that seem to regard corporations principally as a source of 
revenue to the state,” those that “regard the corporation somewhat 
suspiciously as something to be dealt with in an extraordinary regulatory 
manner,” and those “where the corporation seems to be neither feared . . . 
nor specially encouraged for purposes of revenue . . . but where 
incorporation is permitted to be effected as an ordinary incident of 
business, allowing generous latitude in such organization and imposing no 
specially drastic regulations.”136  Though the drafting committee claimed 
that its proposed Act harmonized these three views, there can be little doubt 
that the committee saw itself as rejecting the extremes of rigid regulation 
and chartermongering, and aimed to take the middle position. 
Although the NCCUSL produced a “tentative” UBCA in 1924, it was 
Ohio’s adoption of a new corporation act in 1926 that marked the 
beginning of a trend toward such laws,137 and the process of Ohio’s 
revisions shows how in-state and out-of-state influences could produce a 
new corporation act.  Ohio’s legislature last rewrote its law thoroughly in 
1851, and the law showed its age by the 1920s.  Until 1927, for instance, 
Ohio limited its corporations to a single corporate purpose, a provision long 
abandoned in most jurisdictions.138  The main supporter of the new law was 
the interest group that stood to benefit most directly from a law that would 
persuade local corporations to incorporate in-state—the Ohio Bar 
Association—which began to push for a new corporation law in 1925.139  
Although a revised act seemed uncontroversial, the Bar Association still 
campaigned carefully to enlist support and defuse any opposition that other 
interest groups in the state could generate.  It held open meetings 
concerning the possible reforms in major Ohio cities, consulted “public 
officials, lawyers, accountants, and business men” as to their views of 
corporation law, and circulated five successive drafts of the proposed law 
 135. Interestingly, the Committee’s seven members hailed from Michigan, Alabama, 
Texas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Missouri.  Only one member came from a 
state that could be accused of competing for charters—New Jersey—and none from 
Delaware.  HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 10. 
 136. Id. at 542. 
 137. Though some commentators noted that Florida adopted a modernized code in 1925, 
later, most commentators pointed to Ohio as the innovator.  See Note, The New Ohio 
Corporation Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1927) (citing OHIO GEN. CORP. ACT §§ 
8623-1 to 8623-138 (1927)). 
 138. Davies, supra note 98, at 487.  Ohio’s 1851 law passed in an era when corporation 
law sought to rein in corporations; at the 1851 Constitutional Convention one delegate 
complained that without tighter restrictions, “the whole state [would] become shingled over 
with corporations.”  Id. 
 139. Id. 
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before submitting it to the legislature.140 
In preparing the law, the Bar Association not only built in-state 
coalitions, but drew on out-of-state expertise.141  The law itself was based 
on the 1924 draft of the NCCUSL’s Uniform Act.  The Bar Association 
also sought “expert and scholarly guidance” from two of the nation’s 
leading corporation law scholars, A. A. Berle of Columbia, a leading critic 
of recent innovations in corporation law, and Cornell’s Robert S. Stevens, 
drafter of the UBCA.142  Berle in particular had harshly criticized elements 
of Delaware’s corporation law, and his presence as a consultant suggested 
that Ohio desired to do more than mimic Delaware’s approach. 
As campaigns for revised corporation laws appeared in other states, 
those states too saw in-state coalition building and interstate consultation.  
In Minnesota, for example, the State Bar Association planned a revised 
corporation code in the late 1920s.143  At that time, Minnesota’s 
constitution did not provide limited liability for all corporations, which 
meant that part of the campaign required a popular vote to amend the 
constitution.144  An initial attempt to amend the constitution failed to gain 
enough votes in 1928, perhaps signaling to the Bar Association that it had 
not built enough of a coalition behind the new reforms.145  In 1931, the Bar 
Association began another effort at revision and organized a drafting 
committee whose members it carefully chose to represent both large and 
small communities, with one member from the University of Minnesota 
Law School.  “The drafting division, thus composed, could not be accused 
of representing any special interest group.  The University connection 
increased the confidence of the Bar and of the public in the committee.”146  
To craft the new Minnesota law, the drafters drew elements from the newly 
finalized UBCA, as well as California’s, Delaware’s, and Ohio’s recently 
revised corporation acts, and presented the bill for further revisions and 
 140. Id. at 488; see also Bickel, supra note 118, at 409 (“The drafts of the Bar 
Association’s work were submitted to lawyers throughout the state as they were produced, 
with the result that the experience of many lawyers is embodied in the final draft.”). 
 141. See generally Ohio State Bar Association, Working Notes of Special Committee to 
Draft Revision of Ohio Corporation Laws (1926). 
 142. Davies, supra note 98, at 487; see also Bickel, supra note 118, at 409 (discussing 
changes in terminology in the new Ohio Corporation Law). 
 143. See generally Current Legislation, Stockholders’ Liability, 14 MINN. L. REV. 64, 67 
(1929) (proposing an amendment to stockholder liability that allowed the legislature “to 
regulate the limit of liability from time to time”); Harvey Hoshauer, The Minnesota Business 
Corporation Act, 18 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1-12 (1933) (analyzing key provisions of Minnesota’s 
new act); Solether & Jennings, supra note 99, at 419 (stating “the Minnesota State Bar 
Association, in 1929, determined to take the initiative to correct [its corporation code]”). 
 144. Minnesota’s constitution of 1872 restricted the provision of limited liability to 
certain corporations.  See Current Legislation, supra note 143, at 67 nn.12 & 13. 
 145. See Solether & Jennings, supra note 99, at 419 n.4. 
 146. Id. at 420. 
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comments to the annual convention of the State Bar.147  Even after this 
process, Minnesota’s legislature held up the revisions, less, it appears, 
because of any specific objections to the law than out of a generalized 
suspicion of any revisions to the corporate code; the Act only passed at the 
tail end of the legislative session.148  This suggests another hurdle that 
proponents of the new laws faced:  a lingering distrust of corporations, 
perhaps exacerbated by the worsening Depression, and which made any 
loosening in once-restrictive laws problematic.149 
This basic pattern, in which states drew on out-of-state expertise and 
models, and built in-state coalitions for reform, repeated itself elsewhere.  
Indiana adopted its new General Corporation Act in 1929 only after it 
exhaustively studied the corporation laws of other states, and decided to 
model the new act on the UBCA.150  Drafters widely circulated drafts of the 
new Indiana act to Indiana attorneys and out-of-state experts.151  
Wisconsin’s approach was similar, though perhaps affected by the unusual 
trust the state placed in its university.  In 1933, when changes to the 
corporation law were first mooted (it being suggested the existing law was 
“defective and antiquated”), the state tasked a law research fellow to 
identify the defects in Wisconsin laws that led Wisconsin-based firms to 
incorporate elsewhere.152  The next year, the State Bar Association 
appointed a special committee to revise the corporation law in conjunction 
with the Law School.  The committee, in drafting, at least claimed to be 
“building upon the admirable work done by the draftsmen of the recent 
corporation acts in Illinois, California, Minnesota, and Ohio; the Uniform 
Business Corporation Act; and the ‘Model Business Corporation Act’ 
drafted by George S. Hills of New York” and published in the Harvard 
Law Review.153  Again, the committee  reached across state lines to have 
Berle serve as a consultant.154  After the committee produced the initial 
 147. Id. at 421-23. 
 148. Id. at 422-23. 
 149. Hostility toward corporations, especially in areas such as the Midwest where the 
Populist movement flourished, dated at least to the late nineteenth century, and probably to 
the early days of the Republic.  CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 5 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2007). 
 150. George O. Dix, The Indiana General Corporation Act, 5 IND. L.J. 107, 107-08 
(1929). 
 151. See id. at 108 (describing the committee’s thorough review and improvement 
process). 
 152. Lloyd K. Garrison, Proposed Redraft of the Wisconsin Corporation Laws, 12 WISC. 
L. REV. 417, 417 (1937).  The study appeared in Shiels, Why do Wisconsin Concerns 
Incorporate in Other States?, supra note 106.  See also Shiels, Thesis, supra note 106. 
 153. Garrison, supra note 152, at 417.  Hills was an expert on corporation finance and a 
freelance consultant on corporation law reform.  George S. Hills, Model Corporation Act, 
48 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (1935). 
 154. JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL:  ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICA ERA 
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draft, lawyers from “smaller towns as well as the larger cities” and a 
special committee of the Wisconsin Society of Certified Public 
Accountants further vetted the law.155 
In part, the proponents of revision did only what any wise reformer 
would do:  they sought consensus and tried to identify and defang potential 
opposition to the proposed changes.  But their careful coalition-building 
also revealed that, even at the end of the 1920s, liberalized laws that 
promised to unshackle corporations could stir opposition.  Such opposition 
certainly materialized in Minnesota, and even more strikingly in Illinois. 
Corporate law revision in Illinois began in 1930, spurred by 
“[m]embers of the Chicago bar specializing in corporate practice.”156  
Illinois previously modified its corporation law in 1919, but had not 
fundamentally revised it since 1872.157  In its initial reform efforts, 
Chicago’s Bar Association reached out to the state bar, but also asked for 
contributions and suggestions from a miscellany of organizations that 
ranged from the state’s three law schools, to the “Illinois State Federation 
of Labor, Illinois Agricultural Association . . . and Chicago Real Estate 
Board.”158  It then formed a research committee to study other state 
statutes, a drafting committee began work thereafter, and the committee 
circulated the proposed drafts to individuals and associations throughout 
the state.159  Despite all these efforts, when drafters presented the proposed 
act to the state legislature in 1931, it “met violent and uncritical hostility 
and efforts to pass it failed.”160  The source of the hostility is difficult to 
identify at this remove—was it a specific provision that angered legislators, 
or a general mistrust of corporations, perhaps spurred by the Depression?  
One commentator later attributed legislative hostility to the provision that 
allowed a corporation an unlimited life.161  Only in 1933, after the 
54 (Free Press 1987). 
 155. Garrison, supra note 152, at 418.  Perhaps this rigorous review held up the Act as it 
was still under consideration in 1938. 
 156. Wilbur G. Katz, The Illinois Business Corporation Act, 12 WISC. L. REV. 473, 473 
(1937). 
 157. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business 
Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 357 (1934) (noting 1919 Act). 
 158. Katz, supra note 156, at 483-84. 
 159. See id. at 484 (“As the drafts of various sections were completed, copies were 
mailed to all members of the general and special committees . . . with requests for 
suggestions and criticisms.”). 
 160. Id. at 485. 
 161. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, supra note 
157, at 389.  There are only spotty records of deliberations in Illinois’s legislature from this 
era, and the search for more detailed reasons for the law’s rejection in 1931 is unavailing.  
One odd factor is that at least one of the state’s major newspapers simply ignored the 1931 
rejection of the act.  In 1931, the Chicago Tribune ran a laudatory account of the act’s 
introduction, highlighting the degree to which the Chicago and Illinois bar associations, the 
state’s law schools, and the state’s accountants and labor federation supported the act.  
  
2009] SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY 601 
 
 
government appointed a commission to review the law, did the state adopt 
a new corporation act, and even that faced opposition in the legislature; 
indeed, the governor refused to sign the resulting bill and it became law 
only through a provision that allowed the state to adopt statutes without a 
governor’s signature.162  Illinois’s difficulties in passing its law indicated 
that 1930s corporations and the laws that governed them still could stir 
passions. 
Separate note should be made of California’s reform efforts.163  
Initially, California’s reform trajectory was not so different from that of 
other states.  By the 1920s, its corporation statutes were antiquated.  Initial 
support for a revised corporation statute and a related state constitutional 
amendment came from attorneys in Los Angeles and San Francisco, who 
gained a powerful ally in Henry W. Ballantine, a corporate law scholar at 
the University of California at Berkeley who was active in national 
corporation law reform efforts and eventually drafted the new act.164  After 
the usual rounds of drafting and consensus-building, aided by public 
meetings throughout the state, the bar produced a corporation code that the 
state legislature adopted in 1929, and also persuaded voters to adopt a 
constitutional amendment that supported certain changes in the law.165  
What distinguished California’s reform effort from that of other states was 
a central provision in the new law, one that required constitutional 
amendment:  it gave California corporations limited liability.  Before 1929, 
California’s law did not provide corporate shareholders with a shield from 
the liabilities of their corporation.166  For this reason, unlike in other states, 
California’s campaign for reform did not focus on the outmoded law as a 
whole, but rather on the state’s problems as the only state without limited 
liability for shareholders. 
By the early 1930s, a movement to reform state corporation laws 
clearly was underway.167  It was equally clear why states sought new laws.  
Evans, supra note 100, at 7.  Yet, this bill later failed.  When reintroduced in 1933, the 
Chicago Tribune again provided laudatory coverage—with no discussion of the bill’s 
rejection in the previous term, or the passions it engendered.  Furlong, supra note 122; New 
Corporate Act, supra note 122. 
 162. Katz, supra note 156, at 485. 
 163. Weinstein, supra note 104, at 439, provides an excellent account of California’s 
developments. 
 164. Id. at 449-50; see also Thomas W. Dahlquist, Henry W. Ballantine, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
171, 171 (1949) (describing Ballantine as “the architect and chief builder of our modern 
California corporation laws”). 
 165. See Weinstein, supra note 104, at 448 (noting that voters approved Senate 
Constitutional Amendment 5 at the November 1928 general election). 
 166. See id. at 446 (“The 1879 California constitution . . . required a system of pro rata 
unlimited liability for shareholders.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 153, at 1334 (“The promulgation of new or revised 
corporation laws during the past few years has stimulated an interest in better organic and 
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To keep locally based corporations incorporated in-state, states felt 
compelled to offer a corporation law that was more flexible and 
accommodating than the nineteenth century set pattern acts.  At the same 
time, drafters avoided the perceived excesses of the laws of the 
chartermongering states, which they believed lacked important protections 
for shareholders.  The reform effort was both a local and national task; 
local, in that state bar associations constructed coalitions to push the 
required changes through the legislature and, in a couple of instances, to 
amend state constitutions; national, in that the drafters relied on the UBCA, 
other states’ modernized acts, and nationally prominent corporation law 
experts to prepare the acts.  The resulting movement did not produce a set 
of identical state laws.  Rather, the new laws shared important family 
resemblances, as they drew on similar models, arose from similar motives, 
and attempted to resolve similar problems.  The next Part of this Article 
examines some of the new acts’ most notable provisions and asks whether 
they actually provided shareholders greater protections than the laws of 
Delaware. 
IV. HOW THE LAW CHANGED 
The provisions of the modernized acts testify both to their drafters’ 
ambitions to craft more shareholder-protective laws than Delaware’s law 
and to the ways that large corporations, and their threats to reincorporate in 
Delaware if faced with overly restrictive laws, curbed those ambitions.  The 
new laws were clearly less rigid than their predecessors, as they were the 
end-product of a decades-long evolution of views about the corporation.  
They embodied the notion that the corporation essentially was the private 
creation of its members, and the contractual agreement of its 
shareholders—not the mandate of the state—dictated its structure and 
operations.168 
regulatory legislation for corporations.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 11, at 312 (noting growth in a belief that 
incorporation was a “natural right” rather than special privilege).  Others have also 
recognized these changes.  See, e.g., HURST, supra note 12, at 70-73 (delineating the 
changes in the corporate structure of contractual rights).  At times, supporters invoked the 
contractual analogy quite explicitly.  See, e.g., Davies, supra note 98, at 488 (noting that the 
committee of lawyers who drafted the Ohio Act “accepted and used as a basis the contract 
theory, though aware that when applied to a corporation with any considerable number of 
shareholders this theory has its limitations and there is no contract in the sense in which the 
term is commonly understood”).  During this period, corporation law retained some rigidity, 
which particularly impeded the development of separate legal rules for the close 
corporation.  See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of 
Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263 (2008) (examining the common law 
development of corporate law for close corporations to show that the corporate law that 
publicly-held corporations use often poorly fits the close corporation). 
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To critics at the time reduction in state oversight and the shift of 
power to management were the laws’ most notable features, and scholars 
often characterize the broader changes in corporation law during this era as 
a move from stricter “set-pattern” acts, to “enabling” acts that “empowered 
businessmen to create whatever arrangements they found most 
serviceable.”169  But not all enabling acts were alike, and they did not 
simply license any given arrangement.  A concern for shareholders and an 
unwillingness to give managers unlimited power leavened many of the acts.  
The question for this part of the Article is the degree to which concerns 
about shareholder protections and managerial limitations found concrete 
expression in specific provisions of the acts.  The answer is mixed. 
The most significant features of the acts are not always visible, 
particularly to today’s readers.170  Many of the changes enacted then, and 
discussed below, were in technical areas of the law that now appear largely 
mechanical (e.g., legal capital rules), or that have become footnotes in 
contemporary law (e.g., the ultra vires doctrine).171  Yet, these changes 
marked fundamental shifts in power within the corporation.  This Part does 
not address every change in corporation law, but rather surveys several 
significant shifts that together illustrate larger contours of the new laws.172 
A. Capital Structure and Legal Capital 
Some of the most fundamental changes in corporation laws concerned 
changes in the apparently arcane requirements of legal capital.  
Understanding the import of these changes, however, is almost impossible 
without understanding ongoing changes in corporations’ capital structures. 
Before the 1920s, corporations’ capital structures were comparatively 
rigid.173  A corporation’s charter recorded the number of shares authorized 
to be issued and their attributes (e.g., preferences or voting rights).  After 
the initial issuance of shares, further issues could be made, but existing 
shareholders had preemptive rights, meaning that the corporation first had 
to issue the shares to them in proportion to their current ownership.174  
 169. HURST, supra note 12, at 70. 
 170. Although today’s observers may not easily understand the differences, they are still 
significant; one observer at the time, for instance, declared the new laws were “radically 
different from their predecessors in pattern and content.” Hills, supra note 152, at 1334. 
 171. See id. (tracing the changes in corporate law). 
 172. Thus, for example, this Article does not attempt to deal with restriction of investor 
informational rights or the issue of non-voting stock. 
 173. Adolf Berle, Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1239, 1239 (1931). 
 174. There were exceptions to this general right of preemption.  See infra Part IV.B 
(explaining that preemptive rights declined incrementally due to changing economic and 
capital structure conditions). 
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Shareholders’ rights were fixed; a corporation could change the shares’ 
attributes only with unanimous consent from the shareholders, which 
suggests that such changes rarely occurred.175  Furthermore, while a 
corporation could issue different kinds of securities—it easily could have 
outstanding common and preferred shares, as well as many different bond 
issues—a corporation tended to have outstanding only a single class of 
common stock.176  While opportunities for managerial malfeasance and 
theft no doubt abounded in this time as in any other, attention most often 
focused on the problems of “watered” stock, meaning stock that was issued 
and purchased for less than its stated value.177 
By the 1920s, several developments conspired to change this situation.  
First was the influx of new investors into the stock market; second was the 
fact that corporations began to issue new kinds of securities.178  Most 
important, however, was the spread of no-par stock and the changes it 
worked on the concept of legal capital.179 
Legal capital rarely attracts attention today; Bayless Manning, who 
wrote the still-definitive treatise Legal Capital, once insisted that the 
subject, while very complex, was neither “very real [nor] very 
important.”180  Even in the 1920s, when legal capital did matter, one 
scholar spoke of the “unspeakable confusion among lawyers and 
accountants over the law relating to ‘capital.’”181  Yet, legal capital rules 
 175. See Rutledge, supra note 11, at 324-26 (describing the process of amending 
articles); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:  
An Essay in the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1633-34 (1989) (describing the 
“vested rights” doctrine, which forbids certain fundamental changes to a corporate charter 
without unanimous shareholder approval). 
 176. See DEWING, supra note 84, at 43 (discussing the appearance of Class A common 
stock after 1923). 
 177. See generally DAVID L. DODD, STOCK WATERING:  THE JUDICIAL VALUATION OF 
PROPERTY FOR STOCK-ISSUE PURPOSES (Colum. Univ. Press 1930) (discussing stock 
watering); see also MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 59-88 (analyzing the incentives for, 
practices in, and consequences of corporate overvaluation, i.e. watering down stock). 
 178. See supra Part II.A (outlining the process by which competition between states 
replaced the restrictive set-pattern acts of the 1880s with more liberal and flexible 
“enabling” corporation statutes). 
 179. See HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 217, 685-96 
(Callaghan & Co. 1927) (discussing issuance of nonpar stocks).  See generally Henry W. 
Ballantine & George S. Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions on Dividends Under 
Modern Corporate Laws, 23 CAL. L. REV. 229 (1935) (describing the development of 
corporate law prior to 1930s). 
 180. BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL viii (Found. Press 
1977); see also JONATHAN BASKIN & PAUL MIRANTI, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
179-82 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (stating that the par values were an initial attempt to 
provide investors with a rough, if possibly flawed, estimate of a corporation's value); 
Coffee, Jr., supra note 175, at 1633 n.35 (describing the legal capital rules as a “vestigial 
remnant”). 
 181. Ballantine, supra note 101, at 477. 
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are important here because they were perceived in the 1920s as a bulwark 
of creditor and shareholder protection, and statutory changes in the rules 
could change the balance of power between shareholder
Understanding the debate over legal capital requires a quick review of 
the evolution of legal capital and par value.  In the nineteenth century, the 
legal capital rules developed to protect shareholders and eventually 
creditors.  At that time, each corporation’s charter authorized at inception a 
certain number of shares and assigned each a par value.  The rules required 
subscribing shareholders to pay par value for each share, and the sum 
received constituted the firm’s legal capital.  Therefore, a corporation that 
sold 100 shares each with a par value of $100 had a legal capital of 
$10,000.182 
Although par value and legal capital requirements first developed to 
assure initial shareholders that all other shareholders had paid a fixed 
amount for their shares,183 they soon evolved into a protection for creditors.  
In other words, legal capital became less a protection for shareholders 
(assuring that other shareholders had paid the corporation equal amounts 
for shares), than for creditors (assuring that the corporation had the stated 
amount of legal capital available in case of insolvency).184  Legal capital 
became a limit on the amount of assets that a corporation could distribute to 
shareholders, and the rules prevented a corporation from distributing funds 
or assets to the extent that it impaired its legal capital.  Although the rules 
were incredibly complex, the underlying principles were clear:  a 
corporation could not sell shares for less than par185 and always had to 
 182. At first, commentators simply used the term “capital” for this amount, but to 
distinguish it from the very different accounting notion of capital, they eventually began to 
use the term “legal capital.”  Moreover, the par value requirement applied only to the 
corporation issuing shares; it required a corporation that sold a share with $100 par value to 
sell the share for $100 (and required the shareholder to pay that amount), but a shareholder 
could later sell those shares for any amount. 
 183. MANNING, supra note 180, at 18-19. 
 184. This was the genesis of the now-defunct “trust fund doctrine,” under which a 
corporation held legal capital for the benefit of creditors.  See Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 
308, 30 F.Cas. 435 (C.C.Me. 1824) (Story, J.) (assuming legal capital is held for the benefit 
of creditors); see also Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the 
Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1331-36 (2007) (describing the 
trust fund doctrine in detail).  Some also asserted that legal capital was a sum that 
shareholders set aside in exchange for the privilege of limited liability.  See Ballantine & 
Hills, supra note 179, at 230 (arguing that shareholders hold legal capital for limited 
liability). 
 185. The sale of shares for less than par, often through a stock-for-asset swap, produced 
“watered” stock and “overcapitalization,” or the illusion that a company had more capital 
than it actually did.  A shareholder might want par value stock on the cheap for obvious 
reasons; the reasons why a corporation might want to appear overcapitalized are more 
complex.  See MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 57-89 (recounting the factors that drive 
incentives for corporate overvaluation). 
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retain a sum at least equal to its legal capital for the benefit of creditors.186  
In contrast, any amount above legal capital—surplus—was available for 
distribution to shareholders. 
These rules could create significant problems for corporations.  Until 
judicial exceptions developed in the 1890s, for example, corporations could 
not sell shares at below par value, even if the market price for shares 
dropped below par.187  A corporation could change the par value of its 
shares only if it amended its charter, which was a burdensome process.  
Although clever lawyers devised ways to slip around some of the legal 
capital rules, none of these expedients seemed satisfactorily to solve the 
underlying problems with par value.188 
The answer seemed obvious when it appeared:  allow corporations to 
issue shares with no par value—a solution that New York first tried in 1912 
and that most states adopted within the next two decades.189  Yet, the 
elimination of par value raised a series of difficult questions about the 
relationships between managers, creditors, and shareholders.  Without par 
value, what protections would be left for creditors or shareholders?190  
 186. This was a minimal amount; legal rules that governed capital might well require a 
corporation to retain more.  For instance, a corporation with outstanding bonds would have 
to retain both its legal capital and an amount sufficient to pay the principal on the bonds.  
Note that the rules did not consider this amount a dedicated fund separate from the rest of 
the corporation’s accounts; it rather marked a limit beyond which a distribution could not 
occur. 
 187. See MANNING, supra note 180, at 23 (showing that the presumption that all 
purchasers paid the par value for stock kept any purchaser from acquiring stock for less). 
Technically, the problem was one not for the corporation but for the purchaser of the shares, 
who would have been legally obligated to the corporation for the shares’ full par value; but 
this effectively deterred anyone from buying newly-issued shares from a corporation at 
below par.  See Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1891) (crafting an exception to the 
rule that allowed a corporation in financial distress to sell shares to the highest bidder, even 
if at a price below par, without making the buyer liable for their full par value). 
 188. For instance, a company could issue shares to an incorporator for full value, then 
purchase the shares back and hold them as “treasury shares”; because the resale of such 
shares from the treasury was not an issuance of shares, they did not have to be at par value.  
BERLE, supra note 84, at 82. 
 189. See generally Cornelius W. Wickersham, The Progress of the Law on No Par Value 
Stock, 37 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1924) (outlining the development of no-par stock law). 
 190. To be sure, par value had already lost some of its protective role.  While nineteenth 
century investors looked to a corporation’s legal capital to estimate its value and ability to 
repay debts, they recognized by the early twentieth century that a corporation’s value was 
tied not to its legal capital—which was, after all, a legal fiction that merely recorded initial 
sums paid for stock—but to its assets and ongoing earnings.  See, e.g., BASKIN & MIRANTI, 
supra note 180, at 182-83 (explaining that better financial reporting led to the declining 
importance of par value in valuing corporations); Adolf A. Berle, The Organization of the 
Law of Corporation Finance, 9 TENN. L. REV. 125, 136 (1931) (arguing that a share’s 
primary attribute is its earning power rather than its book value); James C. Bonbright, The 
Dangers of Shares Without Par Value, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 454-55 (1924) (discussing 
the weaknesses of arguments to do away with par values). 
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Scholars expressed these worries chiefly as concerns for creditors.  The 
elimination of par value seemed to threaten the elimination of legal capital 
as well, and if legal capital were eliminated, so too would be the cushion of 
assets upon which creditors depended.191  Yet, the debate also implicated 
shareholder protection; indeed A. A. Berle, writing in the 1920s, claimed 
that the invention of no-par stock probably was “the greatest single step in 
transferring control of property rights from stockholders to corporate 
managements.”192 
Berle probably exaggerated, but changes in the legal capital rules did 
offer managers new powers over shareholders, and potentially the ability to 
favor some shareholders at others’ expense.  One threat posed was that 
managers could issue no-par shares at low prices to new purchasers and 
thus give those purchasers a claim on the corporation’s assets without 
exacting a fair contribution from them.193  The elimination of preemptive 
rights—discussed below—compounded this problem, as current 
shareholders no longer had guaranteed participation in a new issue.194  A 
second worrisome scenario essentially involved the reverse of the above 
transaction, one that would transfer assets from new shareholders to old 
shareholders.  The elimination of par value might make it possible to sell 
shares to a group of new shareholders, and then distribute immediately all 
funds from the sale to the shareholders as a group, as consideration for the 
shares would not necessarily be included in legal capital.195  Berle and 
Means outlined such a scenario in The Modern Corporation and Public 
Property, and claimed that this “real danger” appeared in corporations with 
more than one class of shareholders, a structure increasingly popular in the 
1920s.196  A corporation with class A and class B shares could, they 
hypothesized, sell additional class A shares for, say, $100, attribute most of 
the price to “surplus” available for immediate distribution, and commence 
“to pay dividends at once to both class A and class B out of the earned 
surplus item contributed by purchasers of class A.  In a word, a part of the 
 191. See Bonbright, supra note 190, at 461 (noting confusion as to whether proceeds of 
sale of non-par stock constitute addition to capital). 
 192. BERLE, supra note 84, at 64.  Proponents of no-par stock also sold the idea as a 
benefit to investors, as it would disabuse them of any notion that a share was worth a stated 
amount merely because that was its par value.  Wickersham, supra note 189, at 464. 
 193. See Bonbright, supra note 190, at 459-62 (stating that the removal of par values 
could lead corporations to set their stated capital at far below their real capital).  
Furthermore, many states, most notably Delaware, essentially gave absolute discretion to a 
Board of Directors to value any property exchanged for shares; as one critic noted, this 
meant a purchaser “may even receive ten thousand shares of stock for a yellow dog and a 
dead cat without being subject to a further assessment.”  Id. at 460. 
 194. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the erosion of preemptive rights). 
 195. See, BERLE & MEANS, supra note 87, at 162-72 (describing the shift of assets among 
groups within the corporation). 
 196. Id. at 168. 
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asset value behind the class A shares is at once distributed to the class B as 
‘dividends.’”197  One can understand why two of the leading experts on 
legal capital concluded that “the function of legal or stated capital is 
threefold:  (1) the protection of the creditors against the shareholder; (2) the 
protection of senior shareholders against junior shareholders; and (3) the 
protection of all shareholders against mismanagement and the impairment 
of their investment and its earning power.”198 
Following the adoption of no-par stock, the law could have abandoned 
the notion of legal capital and left shareholders and creditors to find other 
means to monitor and protect their interests in a corporation.  No state 
appears to have gone this far, though the approach taken by Delaware and 
most other states was close; they adopted legal capital rules that allowed a 
corporation to decide how much of any payment received for no-par shares 
it would count as legal capital, and how much it would count as surplus.199  
In other words, directors of a Delaware corporation could declare that all 
monies received for sale of no-par shares was surplus available for 
immediate distribution. 
Despite their claim to provide greater protection to shareholders, 
several of the earliest of the reforming state laws took a similar tack, which 
suggests that legal capital did not always top their drafters’ agendas.  For 
example, Ohio’s 1927 act did not mandate that a corporation declare 
consideration received for no-par shares as capital rather than surplus 
(which would make the consideration unavailable for distribution); the act 
required only that a corporation include consideration received for no-par 
shares in the firm’s “stated capital” unless otherwise specified at the time 
of issuance.200  Ohio’s act did, however, erect other protections around 
legal capital; for instance, it mandated accounting procedures to calculate 
stated capital, thus confounding any attempts to make excess distributions 
 197. Id. 
 198. Ballantine & Hills, supra note 179, at 233. 
 199. As Bonbright explains: 
It would seem, then, that under the Delaware law a company issuing shares 
without par value is entirely free to credit to capital account as large or as small 
a part of its assets as it sees fit.  If this is so, a company may issue stock for fifty 
dollars a share and simply by crediting all but five dollars to its surplus rather 
than to capital may leave itself free to pay back to its shareholders forty-five 
dollars a share. 
Bonbright, supra note 190, at 461; see also id. at 458 (noting most states followed the 
Delaware model) accord Ballantine & Hills, supra note 179, at 237, 240 (noting that a 
number of states, including Delaware, allowed consideration for no-par shares to be 
classified as surplus). 
 200. See Note supra note 137, at 1146 (citing OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 8623-23, 8623-37).  
As to the new term “stated capital,” reformers of the legal capital rules also happily revised 
the terminology, hence the proliferation of terms to replace “legal capital.”  See, e.g., 
Ballantine & Hills, supra note 179, at 235 (discussing various changes in terminology). 
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through manipulations.201  The point was to create “as public, as easy to 
ascertain by all concerned, and as important a measuring rod to determine 
shareholders’ obligations, the right to declare dividends, directors’ liability, 
etc., as ‘capital stock,’ . . . used to be in days before no par stock.”202 
Later corporation acts provided more stringent rules concerning legal 
capital, perhaps most significantly California’s 1929 corporate law.  Henry 
Ballantine, an expert on legal capital, drafted that law, which implemented 
a three-tier measure for legal capital and surplus, marking out separate 
categories for “stated capital,” “paid-in surplus,” and “surplus.”203  
Whereas in other jurisdictions consideration paid for no-par stock was 
typically split between capital and surplus at the directors’ discretion, in 
California it was to be split between “stated capital” and the new category 
of “paid-in surplus.”  Paid-in surplus was hedged about with limits on 
distribution; corporations could not, for instance, immediately distribute it 
to shareholders.  Tellingly, one justification for the new category of paid-in 
surplus was to protect preferred shareholders from corporate management, 
who had evidently victimized such shareholders in the past when they sold 
them preferred shares and immediately used the proceeds to pay a dividend 
on common shares.204  As Ballantine and Hills later explained: 
Under such a lax provision such as that of the acts of Delaware, 
New York and some other states much of the consideration 
contributed by one class of shares . . . may be distributed to the 
holders of junior classes of shares in the form of dividends or 
purchase price of shares.  The more carefully drawn modern acts 
have, accordingly, distinguished between earned surplus and 
paid-in surplus, and earned surplus is made the basis or source of 
dividends upon common shares.205 
 201. See Austin Tappan Wright, The New Ohio General Corporation Act, 75 U. PA. L. 
REV. 753, 753-54 (1927) (describing the safeguards that the new Ohio act put in place). 
 202. Id. at 753. 
 203. This is not the first appearance of “paid-in surplus”—the concept apparently arose 
with the adoption of no-par stock and the rule that a corporation could allot some 
consideration for it to surplus.  Initially, however, most states’ rules treated paid-in surplus 
the same as any other kind of surplus; “it was left available for dividends and share 
purchases in the manner as if it had resulted from business earnings.”  Hills, supra note 153, 
at 1336.  Only later did the laws begin to treat paid-in surplus as a separate category of 
surplus with its own distributional limitations. 
 204. Id.; BALLANTINE, supra note 102, at 122-24 (reprinting CAL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 87-
89).  The exact limits are complex, but one provision, for example, forbade the use of paid-
in surplus to pay dividends on common stocks, but allowed it to make payments on 
dividends of preferred stock.  See Katz, supra note 156, at 475-76 (“The danger of deception 
from the payment of dividends from sources other than earnings is minimized by the 
provision that the source of the dividend must be disclosed to the shareholders receiving 
it.”).  The provisions for distributions and use of the various kinds of surplus were quite 
elaborate; this discussion essays only their broad contours. 
 205. Ballantine & Hills, supra note 179, at 243. 
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The provision was clearly intended to protect creditors and some 
shareholders; “[s]uch restrictions on the use of paid-in surplus in effect 
treat it as a reserve or margin of value for the protection of preferred 
shareholders and those having claims against the corporation, although it is 
not formally capitalized.”206  Other states also adopted similar provisions 
concerning paid-in surplus, including Illinois and Minnesota in their 1933 
revised corporation acts.207 
These more stringent legal capital rules reflect both the reformers’ 
desire to curb management power and their sometimes limited ability to do 
so.  In states like California, Illinois, and Minnesota, limits were placed on 
distributions not just to protect creditors but also shareholders.  These 
revisions were not minor, and did provide new safeguards.  Yet, as will be 
discussed below, they still occurred against a backdrop of developments 
that eroded the power of and protections for shareholders overall, and 
limited the reformers’ goals. 
B. Preemptive Rights 
Closely related to the transformation of corporate capital structures 
was the erosion of preemptive rights.  A preemptive right was the equitable 
right of a shareholder in an existing corporation to purchase a pro rata share 
of any new share issuance.208  For example, under the doctrine, a 
shareholder who owned ten shares of a company with 100 shares 
outstanding would have first claim on 10% of any additional issue of 
shares.209  Dating back to the early nineteenth century, the right was part of 
the shareholder’s property interest in the corporation.  Some contended that 
the doctrine protected a shareholder’s voting power and ensured that a 
corporation could not use new issues to reduce an existing shareholder’s 
percentage vote; others depicted it as essentially an economic protection 
 206. Id. 
 207. The Illinois and Minnesota acts allowed limited payments of certain dividends out 
of paid-in surplus.  See Ballantine & Hills, supra note 179, at 244 (discussing relevant 
sections of the Illinois and Minnesota acts). 
 208. Courts generally accepted the right as equitable; it was a judicial creation to protect 
shareholders, which dated back to Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 364 (Mass. 
1807).  See Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act:  
Death Knell for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 264 (1993) (explaining 
preemptive rights doctrines and cumulative voting). 
 209. See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 179, § 135 (discussing existing 
stockholders’ rights and remedies vis-à-vis new stock in the 1920s); Victor Morawetz, The 
Preemptive Rights of Shareholders, 42 HARV. L. REV. 186 (1928) (discussing preemption 
rights); Alexander Hamilton Frey, Shareholders’ Preemptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 
(1929) (discussing preemption rights).  The right attached to additional issuances for cash, 
but not property—an important exception that the issuance of shares during an acquisition 
likely made necessary.  BALLANTINE, supra note 179, § 135, at 423. 
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that preserved a shareholder’s claim on a fixed percentage of corporate 
property.210  Though the doctrine had notable exceptions—it did not, for 
example, apply when shares were exchanged for property—scholars into 
the 1920s viewed it as an important protection for shareholders who were 
concerned that managers would appropriate their claims to the 
corporation.211 
The 1920s, however, saw the doctrine go into steep decline.  Around 
1919, corporate charters began to include provisions that claimed to 
eliminate preemptive rights,212 and the modern corporation acts of the 
1920s and 1930s transformed preemptive rights by changing them from 
mandatory to optional.213  Ohio’s 1927 Act, for example, limited 
preemptive rights to certain classes of shares and explicitly allowed a 
corporation to renounce such rights in its charter.214  California’s act went 
further, eliminated preemptive rights unless provided for in the charter.215  
Illinois’s 1933 act similarly included provisions that allowed a corporation 
to limit or deny shareholders’ preemptive rights.216 
This development, as with so many others in this period, undercut the 
position of existing shareholders, especially because many issues under the 
preemptive doctrine were priced at slightly below market, which gave 
existing shareholders of a corporation both the right to preserve their pro 
 210. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 87, at 176-80, 256-59 (discussing the 
emergence and history of preemptive rights in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); 
WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK § 
286, 946-62 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 8th ed. 1923) (discussing preemptive rights).  Unlike 
some of the doctrines discussed here, preemptive rights have not disappeared from 
corporation law, though all states now, at a minimum, allow corporate charters to eliminate 
them.  JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 497 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 
2003). 
 211. See RIPLEY, supra note 89, at 40 (noting that this “serious trespass” on shareholder 
rights originated with corporation lawyers). 
 212. On the use of corporate charters to restrict preemptive rights, see RIPLEY, supra note 
89, at 38-40 (citing the charter provisions of corporations, including Great A&P Tea Co., 
General Baking Corp., and Standard Oil of California).  It is not clear, however, whether 
these provisions were enforceable. 
 213. A few state laws offered the possibility to eliminate preemptive rights earlier; 
amendments to Massachusetts’s corporation law in 1902 gave majority stockholders “the 
power to fix the terms and manner of disposition of the increased stock, thus enabling them 
to eliminate preemptive rights.”  Dodd, supra note 11, at 37.  In general, however, new 
corporation acts decisively limited preemption rights.  See Rutledge, supra note 11, at 330-
31 (“Most of the statutes permit the articles to make any provision desired concerning 
[preemptive rights] . . . .  Thus another of the shareholder’s protections is on its way out.”). 
 214. See Bickel, supra note 118, at 419-20 (reviewing old and new Ohio corporate 
statutes on preemptive rights); see also Wright, supra note 201, at 754-58 (highlighting 
negative aspects of the Ohio General Corporation Act with regard to preemptive rights). 
 215. BALLANTINE, supra note 102, at 140 (citing CAL. CORP. L. § 98). 
 216. See Dodd, supra note 11, at 45 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 47 (1935)). 
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rata ownership stake and a chance to buy new shares cheap.217  Yet 
preemptive rights were probably doomed by larger economic 
developments.  It is tempting to blame the death of preemptive rights on 
dispersed shareholding, under the reasoning that a corporation could not 
offer a new issue first to thousands of shareholders.  Into the 1920s, 
however, it appears that some publicly held corporations did just that; 
American Telephone and Telegraph routinely offered shareholders a 
preemptive right to purchase newly issued shares, even though it was the 
most widely held corporation in the 1920s with over 400,000 
shareholders.218 
The problem with preemptive rights lay not in the number of 
shareholders, but in the new capital structures.  By the 1920s, corporations 
often issued multiple classes of shares—often several different classes of 
preferred stock, each with its own voting rights and claims on corporate 
assets, and increasingly more than one class of common stock.219  In such 
an intricate capital structure, asked one scholar, how could an “issue be 
apportioned as between the holders of prior preference shares, with limited 
participation in earnings and limited voting rights, holders of first preferred 
shares with full voting rights and no participation, and holders of class A 
and class B common shares?”220  The difficulty of solving such 
apportionment problems—of figuring out who really had a claim on a new 
issue—led statutes’ drafters to weaken preemptive rights.  Even ardent 
reformers admitted that preemptive rights were no longer practicable.  “[I]n 
a complex corporate structure the proper assignment of preemptive rights is 
simply insoluble,” concluded Ballantine.221  Berle also conceded that the 
preemptive right created too many problems; “where the classification of 
stock is carried to the extreme lengths now prevalent it becomes almost, if 
not wholly, impossible to work out a rule which will do justice to the 
situation.”222  This is not to say there were no objections.  In Main Street 
and Wall Street, William Z. Ripley protested that the erosion of preemptive 
rights marked a “serious trespass upon the customary rights of 
shareholders.”223  Nevertheless, his complaints went unheeded, as almost 
all the new laws made preemptive rights optional and removed what had 
once been a bedrock protection for shareholders. 
 217. RIPLEY, supra note 89, at 38-39. 
 218. See Berle, supra note 173, at 1258 (noting AT&T has “scrupulously maintained” 
the preemptive rights of its shareholders). 
 219. A good example is given in Henry S. Drinker, Jr., The Preemptive Right of 
Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARV. L. REV. 586, 610 (1930). 
 220. Id. at 611-12. 
 221. Ballantine, supra note 101, at 469; see also BALLANTINE, supra note 102, at 98-101 
(citing § 73, Reasons for the Abrogation of Preemptive Rights). 
 222. Berle, supra note 173, at 1258. 
 223. RIPLEY, supra note 89, at 40. 
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C. Blank Stock and Stock Options 
While the new statutes innovated in some important ways, at least as 
often, their task was to respond to and channel doctrines already adopted by 
more corporate-friendly states.  Such was the case with “blank stock” and 
stock options, innovations that were notable not only because of the issues 
they raised, but also because they came with their own nemesis:  A. A. 
Berle.224 
Berle’s involvement sheds more light on state lawmaking in the 
1920s.  This Article already discussed how states proceeded to adopt 
“modern” corporation statutes, through the deep involvement of state and 
local bar associations and recourse to an interstate network to support 
passage of the new laws.225  Things worked differently in Delaware.226  
Berle knew this because he had been involved in the process of amending 
Delaware’s corporation laws.  In 1927, the Corporation Trust Company 
(“CTC”), a Delaware-based firm that assisted corporations reincorporating 
in Delaware, assembled a panel of New York corporate lawyers to redraft 
parts of Delaware’s corporation law.227  According to Berle, the CTC hired 
as its Wilmington counsel the secretary of the Delaware Bar Association, 
and thereby got its proposals quickly through the legislature.228  While 
Berle served on the CTC’s committee, he ultimately failed to persuade the 
majority to adopt the reforms he proposed.229  Defeated there, he instead 
launched an attack on the changes to the Delaware act.230 
The innovation he most detested was “blank stock.”  Blank stock 
originated as a solution to problems associated with the requirement that a 
corporate charter record all the attributes of authorized stock.231  While this 
 224. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 
COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1929) (examining features of the 1929 amendments to the Delaware 
Corporation Act). 
 225. See supra Part III (discussing major changes to various state corporation laws that 
occurred since the mid-1920s). 
 226. The best contemporary account of Delaware corporation lawmaking is Hamermesh, 
supra note 17, at 1752-56. 
 227. See SCHWARZ, supra note 154, at 55 (noting Berle’s participation in the CTC 
committee and his concern for the individual investor).  For Berle’s own more guarded 
account of this process, see Berle, supra note 224, at 563-64 (commenting on the history of 
the 1929 amendments to the Delaware Corporation Act and the theory behind the changes).  
CTC has had a long involvement in Delaware lawmaking; a CTC representative also sat on 
the committee that revised Delaware’s corporation law in 1967.  Cary, supra note 8, at 690. 
 228. SCHWARZ, supra note 154, at 55. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Some of Berle’s criticisms found their way into THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 87, but his initial salvo was Investors and the Revised 
Delaware Corporation Act, supra note 224, at 563 passim. 
 231. This paragraph draws on Berle, supra note 224, at 566-67, and BERLE & MEANS, 
supra note 87, at 185-87. 
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posed little problems for common stock, it created difficulties with the 
issuance of preferred stock after incorporation.  Preferred stock’s value was 
tied to its dividend rate, generally expressed as a percentage of its par value 
(e.g., 8% preferred with par value $100 returned $8 a year).232  But, interest 
rates fluctuated over time and a share with a fixed dividend could well be 
unmarketable, at least at par value, at the time a corporation needed to issue 
it.  Corporate charters thus began to give “management the power to 
change the provisions of authorized but unissued preferred stock to fit 
market conditions.”233  Hence, blank stock. 
Berle’s problem with blank stock was not its limited use to set a 
dividend for preferred stock, but the possibility that its untrammeled use 
could further tilt the balance of power between managers and 
shareholders.234  Delaware’s revised law allowed a corporation to have 
authorized but unissued stock with “voting powers, designations, 
preferences and relative, participating optional or other rights if any” to be 
determined by the Board at the time the stock was issued.235  In Berle’s 
eyes, this empowered the Board to set a dividend rate and “issue stock in 
such a way as to vary the pro rata share of all outstanding stock; to vary 
their dividend participations; to vary their relative strength; in short, to do 
pretty much as they will with the existing shareholders.”236  Blank stock, 
according to Berle, was a license to print stock with any qualities the Board 
wished. 
Almost as provoking as blank stock was the stock purchase warrant or 
“stock option.”237  While corporation finance occasionally used stock 
options—securities that give the holder the right to purchase stock at a 
fixed price at a later date— since at least the 1870s, stock options lacked 
explicit statutory authorization before Delaware revised its corporation law 
in 1929.238  This modification was a straightforward attempt to 
accommodate changes in the financial markets.  While common stock 
gained a much better reputation in the 1920s, many purchasers still saw 
bonds or preferred stock as safer investments.  Those instruments, however, 
 232. Because preferred stock had a liquidation preference—i.e., in case of liquidation, 
preferred stock with $100 par value received $100—it often still had a par value, and 
corporations were unwilling to sell it below par. 
 233. Berle, supra note 224, at 566. 
 234. Writing to a friend about the new innovations, Berle stated that “compared to this, 
the non-voting stock provisions of a few years ago are child’s play.”  SCHWARZ, supra note 
154, at 55. 
 235. Berle, supra note 224, at 566-67 n.5 (quoting DEL. REV. CODE ch. 65, § 13 (1929)). 
 236. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 87, at 186. 
 237. See id. at 180-85 (describing stock options, or “stock purchase warrants”). 
 238. Id. at 181 n.48.  Accord Grimes v. Alteon, 804 A.2d 256, 263-64 (Del. 2002) 
(describing the 1929 statute as “the first statute in the nation expressly to authorize the 
issuance of stock options”). 
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lacked access to the upside potential available with common stock.239  In 
the 1920s, then, corporations began to attach a stock warrant “kicker” to 
some bonds and preferred shares to give buyers access to the appreciation 
of a firm’s common stock.  Many of these warrants were permanently 
attached to the securities they accompanied, but some were not and could 
be split off and traded independently. 
Delaware’s 1929 corporation law revisions specifically authorized 
stock options.240  Two aspects of the change incensed Berle:  that the option 
could be eternal, and that a corporation’s Board could issue the options by 
a mere resolution.241  The combination of broad power to issue options, and 
the secrecy that could surround them, appeared to offer a Board unlimited 
power to transfer wealth from existing stockholders to options-holders.  
The result, Berle believed, made it possible “for the board of directors, by 
simple resolution, to authorize options on all or any part of a company’s 
capital stock at any price deemed fit, and such options may run forever.”242  
This was not a theoretical concern; organizers of the utilities holding 
companies that characterized in the 1920s sometimes granted themselves 
significant options in the firms, effectively giving themselves a 
disproportionate claim on future earnings.243 
Despite Berle’s objections, both blank stock and stock options became 
common tools of corporate finance.  Blank stock did not, it appears, 
become a serious problem.  Several years after his jeremiad against blank 
stock, Berle admitted that he “ha[d] come across no certificate [of 
incorporation] which has not, to some extent, limited the power of directors 
. . . ; either because the power was not realized, or, because its existence 
seemed too drastic even for the corporate organizers of today.”244 
Stock options present an even more interesting case because they not 
only survived in Delaware law, but were authorized by some of the new, 
shareholder-protective modern corporation acts.  Ohio’s revised act 
authorized stock options as early as 1927, an inclusion that did not earn 
Berle’s wrath, perhaps because he was focused on Delaware as the legal 
home of giant corporations.245  Yet, California’s corporation code, adopted 
 239. See Russell D. Garner & Alfred S. Forsythe, Stock Purchase Warrants and 
“Rights,” 4 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 269 (1930) (describing the post-war shift in investment 
preferences from preferred stock to common stock); Grossman, supra note 85, at 130. 
 240. See Berle, supra note 224, at 570 n.9 (citing DEL. REV. CODE ch. 65, § 14 (1929)).  
The use of the options before 1929 suggests that many authorities believed they were legal; 
the revision of the Delaware code merely ratified the arrangement. 
 241. Berle, supra note 224, at 570. 
 242. Id. 
 243. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 36 (Aspen Publishers 3d 
ed. 2003) (discussing the United Corp.). 
 244. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 87, at 186. 
 245. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 102, § 71, at 92 (claiming to follow “the 
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two years after Berle’s attack, also authorized stock options despite the fact 
that the law’s drafter agreed with much of Berle’s critique.  Stock options 
were, Ballantine admitted, 
subject to grave abuse.  They may be utilized as a subtle 
contrivance to keep a string on all future corporate growth, 
prosperity and increment in value without expense or risk or 
adequate consideration.  When exercised at less than the value of 
the shares, they dilute the value of outstanding shares and transfer 
an interest in the surplus from the investors who took the risk to 
the option holders.246 
Discussing ways to limit the risk in his treatise, California 
Corporation Laws, Ballantine presented Berle’s proposals to rein in stock 
options, which included making their issuance public, limiting the number 
issued to a percentage of the corporation’s outstanding shares, and giving 
them an expiration date.247  Yet, none of these protections made it into 
California’s code.  The drafting committee concluded that any statutory 
limits would be “unwise . . . because the matter of granting options may be 
sufficiently regulated by the courts and the commissioner of corporations 
and statutory regulations might unduly hamper business.”248  The need to 
attract incorporations limited reformers’ options; California rejected even a 
measure to merely eliminate some possible abuses of stock options because 
of its potential to “unduly hamper business.”  The provisions’ inclusion 
also illustrates how often reformers hewed to existing corporation law 
standards; even California’s shareholder-friendly and “modern” 
corporation act incorporated provisions remarkably similar to Delaware’s. 
D. Amending the Charter 
Central to power in a corporation is the power to amend its charter.  
Among the major trends in the 1920s were statutory changes that gave 
directors and majority shareholders new “powers of amendment of the 
articles with consequent restriction, if not elimination, of the fixed 
contractual and ‘vested’ rights of the shareholder.”249 
Delaware and Ohio Acts, under which the board of directors is authorized by resolution to 
give options to purchase or subscribe or convert or exchange securities for shares upon such 
terms as may be deemed expedient”). 
 246. Id. at 93. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 94. 
 249. Rutledge, supra note 11, at 310.  For a more theoretical account that addresses 
charter amendments, see Lucien Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in 
Corporate Law:  The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1820 (1989) (arguing for limits on opt-out charter amendments because of information and 
collective action problems in the charter amendment process). 
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The issue of when and how a corporation’s charter could be altered 
long predated the 1920s.  In the nineteenth century, a corporation’s charter 
was conceived of as, among other things, a contract among the 
shareholders,250 and under classic contract law a contract could be modified 
only with the agreement of all the parties.251  Obviously, this gave minority 
shareholders power to block any proposal that the majority made to alter 
any feature of a charter.  In response, doctrines slowly developed to allow a 
majority of shareholders to amend a charter so long as the amendment did 
not “fundamentally change the character of the corporation, or its objects, 
but which [was] merely in furtherance of the objects for which it was 
created, and for the purpose of enabling it the better to carry out those 
objects.”252  Although this was useful for corporate managers and majority 
shareholders who desired to alter some aspects of a corporation’s 
operations, the doctrines still reflected nineteenth century views that the 
corporation was fundamentally a static enterprise with a set purpose and 
structure. 
The move to greater flexibility in charter amendments traces back to 
the laws of mergers and consolidations.  Under the old rule, any plan to 
merge a corporation into another or to accomplish the same end by selling 
its assets, required unanimous shareholder approval, which invited a holdup 
by an objecting shareholder.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, judges increasingly refused to give a minority such a veto.253  So 
was born the appraisal remedy; it allowed a majority of shareholders to 
authorize a merger or sale of a corporation’s assets while giving dissenting 
shareholders not a veto but the right receive an independently determined 
price for their shares.254 
 250. The charter also was a contract between the corporation and the state.  The question 
of when the state could change the charter also loomed large in the nineteenth century, 
especially after the Supreme Court imposed limits on state alteration of a charter in the 
Dartmouth College case.  See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 519, 605 
(1819) (noting that the legislature cannot amend a private corporation’s charter without the 
consent of the grantees).  The question of when and how a legislature could change a 
corporate charter is separate from the question considered here:  how shareholders could 
change the charter.  A charter still is a contract among shareholders, however fictive the 
notion might appear. 
 251. See WILLIAM W. COOK, supra note 210, § 500 (characterizing such a change as a 
constitutional violation of stockholders’ contract rights). 
 252. BALLANTINE, supra note 179, § 281, at 826.  This broad statement disguises a huge 
body of case law in which courts wrestled with which changes to the charter were so 
fundamental as to require consent of all shareholders. 
 253. See Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal 
Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233-35 (1931) (noting that courts would give the minority 
rights similar to the appraisal remedy before the passage of statutes that granted such 
appraisal rights). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.  Legislatures passed the appraisal 
statutes mostly in the early twentieth century, though New Jersey and Delaware had 
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Similar doctrines soon arose concerning charter amendments.  As 
noted above, the common law rule did not allow a mere majority of 
shareholders to work a “fundamental” change in a corporate charter, such 
as changing its purpose or capital structure.  Yet, by the turn of the century 
(and probably sooner), such changes became increasingly necessary for 
corporations with dispersed stockholders that navigated a fluid commercial 
landscape.  Corporations needed the freedom to enter new business fields 
or to issue new securities, even if these changes disadvantaged existing 
shareholders.  New Jersey law made allowances early on for majorities that 
wished to fundamentally change their corporations’ charters, and Delaware 
followed close behind.255  Delaware’s 1915 corporation act allowed a 
corporation to, by less than unanimous agreement: 
[A]mend its charter of incorporation, either by addition to its 
corporate powers and purposes, or diminution thereof, and by 
substitution of other powers and purposes in whole or in part, for 
those prescribed by its charter . . . or by making any other change 
or alteration in its Charter of incorporation that may be desired; 
provided only that such amendment, change, or alteration, shall 
contain only such provisions as it would be lawful and proper to 
insert in an original certificate of incorporation . . . .256 
Minority shareholders who objected had little recourse, much less an 
appraisal remedy.  While Delaware courts later stepped in to craft a few 
equitable protections for shareholders severely disadvantaged by such 
changes, minority shareholders still had relatively few protections from 
such changes.257 
Unsurprisingly, most new corporation acts sought a middle ground.  
They tended to allow amendments even in the face of shareholder dissent, 
appraisal statutes for mergers and acquisitions by the turn of the century.  See Manning, 
supra note 67, at 246 n.38 (noting that New Jersey first passed an appraisal statute in 1878, 
while Delaware first passed such a statute in 1899). 
 255. The spread of this new stance, which allowed shareholders to fundamentally alter 
the corporate charter on a less-than-unanimous vote, was slow and uneven.  In 1923, one of 
the standard treatises on corporation law could still assert that “a material and fundamental 
change in the charter by an amendment to that charter is an unconstitutional violation of the 
contract rights of any shareholder who does not assent to such an amendment.”  COOK, 
supra note 210, § 500, at 1313. 
 256. ROBERT PENNINGTON, A TREATISE ON DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW § 26, at 104 
(1925) (quoting DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 26). 
 257. Most notably, in 1923, a Delaware court held that a majority could not change a 
corporate charter to eliminate preferred shareholders’ accrued dividends.  Morris v. 
American Public Utilities Co., 122 A. 696, 703-06 (Del. Ch. 1923).  A later decision, 
however, effectively bypassed this case when it allowed a merger to effect a similar result, 
so long as an appraisal remedy was provided.  Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 
331, 344 (Del. Ch. 1940) (discussed in Manning, supra note 67, at 227-28); see Cary, supra 
note 8, at 677-78 (stating that all shareholders did not have to approve a merger so long as 
there was an appraisal remedy). 
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subject to Board approval, while sometimes providing stronger protections 
for dissenting minority shareholders.258  The UBCA, for instance, allowed 
any amendment of the charter by “two-thirds of the voting power of all 
shareholders,” unless the charter itself specified a different number.259 
The new acts also addressed a particular danger posed by the 
confluence of more permissive rules concerning charter amendments and 
the increasing complexity of corporations’ capital structures:  the danger 
that majority shareholders could use charter amendments to strip rights 
away from minority shareholders.  As discussed above, by the 1920s, large 
corporations increasingly had outstanding several different classes of 
preferred and common shares whose attributes were set out in the 
charter.260  The interests of these different classes did not always align, and 
could at times be at odds.  In particular, common and preferred 
shareholders often vied for limited sums available for distribution to 
shareholders; to the extent that preferred shareholders were guaranteed 
cumulated dividends, for instance, the amounts available for distribution to 
common shareholders were reduced.  As the charter recorded the attributes 
and rights of all shares, the power to change the charter would, if not 
checked, allow a majority of shareholders to vote to change the preferences 
and rights of a class of minority shareholders.261  This power particularly 
threatened preferred shareholders, as common shareholders typically 
outnumbered them.  Under a regime that allowed a majority of 
shareholders to change charters, a majority composed of common 
shareholders could potentially take a host of actions to disfavor preferred 
shareholders, from reducing the preferred shareholders’ fixed dividend, to 
issuing securities senior to the current preferred securities, thereby 
completely undermining the position of these minority shareholders.262 
To protect minority shareholders, especially preferred shareholders, 
almost all the new corporation acts adopted class voting, which required a 
 258. On statutory changes concerning charter amendments, see Routledge, supra note 
11, at 324-26.  Surprisingly, even as late as 1930, stockholders had comparatively few 
shields against charter changes.  One observer noted in that year that appraisal rights, for 
example, were limited to cases where a minority objected to a corporation’s merger or 
consolidation.  Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 
15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 422 (1930). 
 259. Unif. Bus. Corp. Act § 38 (1930). 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86. 
 261. The laws discussed below, and the occasional equitable interventions by the courts, 
have limited this theoretical power. 
 262. Merrick Dodd nicely captured the dangers that such an ability to change the charter, 
and thus shares’ attributes, posed:  “One who . . . buys seven per cent cumulative first 
preferred stock in a rubber factory does not expect his investment to be metamorphosed into 
five percent non-cumulative second preferred stock in an iron foundry.”  Merrick Dodd, 
Amendment of the Corporate Articles Under the New Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 129, 134 (1931). 
  
620 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
charter amendment that disadvantaged a class of stock to be approved by 
the holders of that class.  Somewhat surprisingly, Delaware adopted this 
approach early and required that a majority of each affected class approve 
any provision that: 
[W]ould alter or change the preferences given to any one or more 
classes of preferred stock, authorized by the certificate of 
incorporation, or would increase or decrease the amount of the 
authorized stock of such class or classes of preferred stock, or 
would increase or decrease the par value thereof.263 
Many of the modern acts contained similar provisions, a number going 
beyond a mere majority class vote requirement.  The UBCA required that 
two-thirds of a class approve any amendment that would “make any 
changes in the rights of the holders of shares of any class, or would 
authorize shares with preferences in any respect superior to those of 
outstanding shares of any class.”264  It also gave a dissenting shareholder 
the same right as a dissenting shareholder in a merger or consolidation:  to 
appraisal resulting in payment of fair value for his shares.265  Ohio’s Act 
took a near-identical approach.266  California, however, provided only more 
limited remedies; its act required a class vote, but rejected the appraisal 
remedy; “[t]he protection against the abuse of the power to amend is found 
in the votes required for the adoption of amendments and in the equitable 
remedies against fraud or abuse of power.”267  This set the general 
trajectory of reform; while most states adopted class voting to protect 
minority shareholders, relatively few states gave them the absolute out of 
an appraisal.268 
 263. PENNINGTON, supra note 256, at 105 (quoting DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 26 (1925)). 
 264. Unif. Bus. Corp. Act § 38 (1930). 
 265. Unif. Bus. Corp. Act § 41 (1930). 
 266. See Dodd, supra note 262, at 141-43 (discussing sections 15 and 72 of the Ohio 
General Corporation Act). 
 267. BALLANTINE, supra note 102, § 347, at 417. 
 268. In 1958, Arthur Lattin found only nine states’ corporation codes provided appraisal 
rights if a change in the charter materially affected a class of shares.  Norman D. Lattin, 
Minority and Dissenting Shareholders’ Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 311 n.8 (1958). 
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E. Ultra Vires 
The changes discussed here shifted power from shareholders to 
management, leaving shareholders less protected than they had been a 
generation before.  Yet, while disempowering to shareholders, some of 
these changes made great sense.  Such is the case with the elimination of 
the ultra vires doctrine.269 
Ultra vires was the term for a transaction “foreign to [the 
corporation’s] authorized business.”270  Born in an era when corporations 
had limited purposes, the ultra vires doctrine held that corporations could 
not perform actions outside their state-chartered authority.271  The 
reasoning behind the doctrine was straightforward; the state created a 
corporation for specific purposes and the corporation lacked power to 
engage in any activity beyond those purposes.  Ultra vires also protected 
shareholders; by banning ultra vires acts, the law blocked managers from 
using shareholders’ property in ways to which the shareholders never 
agreed.272  As the Supreme Court held in 1830, the “exercise of the 
corporate franchise . . . cannot be extended beyond the letter and spirit of 
the act of incorporation.”273 
As the doctrine developed over the nineteenth century, it accumulated 
complexities and contradictory holdings.  A particular problem was that 
courts generally held that a corporation’s ultra vires contracts were not 
merely voidable, but void; that is, if a corporation entered into a contract 
beyond its powers, the corporation could not be bound by the contract.274  
To mitigate this harsh result, other courts carved out exceptions by ruling 
that a corporation would be estopped from invoking ultra vires under some 
 269. On the doctrine, see generally BALLANTINE, supra note 179, §§ 67-86 (discussing 
the doctrine); HOVENKAMP supra note 37, at 59-64 (explaining the scope of the doctrine). 
 270. BALLANTINE, supra note 179, at 234. 
 271. HOVENKAMP, supra note 269, at 59.  In a quo warranto proceeding, a state Attorney 
General could move to enjoin a corporate action as ultra vires; they used such actions in the 
late nineteenth century to challenge corporations’ abilities to participate in trust 
arrangements.  See CHERNOW, supra note 60, at 331 (noting such an action in 1889 by 
Ohio’s attorney general against Standard Oil). 
 272. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives!  A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate 
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 
87 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2001) (noting the doctrine protected shareholders who invested 
based on the scope of the corporation’s activities). 
 273. Id. at 1302 (quoting Beaty v. Lessee of Knowler, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152, 167 (1830)). 
 274. Under ultra vires, the law charged individuals with constructive knowledge of a 
corporation charter’s limits.  In this sense, ultra vires rejected the doctrine of apparent 
authority, for even if a corporate officer reasonably appeared to have authority to bind the 
corporation, the corporation would be bound only if the corporation actually had such power 
to enter into the contract, as determined by its charter. 
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circumstances to avoid an executed contract.275  As the century progressed 
and exceptions multiplied, ultra vires appeared less as a shareholder 
protection from managerial overreaching, and more as a tool occasionally 
available for corporations to avoid the obligations of their contracts.276  One 
authority described it as “a doctrine of business immorality, if not legalized 
plunder.”277  According to one scholar, by the 1920s, there was “perhaps no 
part of the law concerning corporations in which we meet with so much 
difficulty, confusion, and conflict of opinion.”278 
Ultra vires also did not fit with changing understandings of the 
corporation.  For most of the nineteenth century the corporation was seen 
as the creation of the state, possessing only the powers bestowed by the 
state.279  Conceptually, under that view, a corporation was literally 
powerless to perform an ultra vires act.  The twentieth century view was 
very different.  As one contemporary commentator wrote: 
When a group of persons may agree together to form a 
corporation and decide upon the powers they shall provide for it-
—and the state is helpless to prevent the formation of the 
corporation with such powers so long as those persons go 
through the formality of complying with certain statutory 
requirements—it seems a little inaccurate to describe the 
corporation as an entity created by the state and deriving its 
powers therefrom.280 
The era’s reformers therefore sought not to improve ultra vires but to 
bury it.281  As with much else, each new corporation act took a slightly 
different approach.  To overcome ultra vires, the UBCA drew a new 
distinction between a corporation’s “capacity” and “authority.”282  A 
 275. See Legislation—Statutory Modification of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 280, 281 (1930-31) (noting that courts looked to theories of estoppel, illegality, and 
public policy to limit the effect of ultra vires). 
 276. See Greenfield, supra note 272, at 1310 (stating that corporations “began to use the 
ultra vires doctrine as a defense to contract actions against them”). 
 277. Chicago Bar Association, supra note 132, at 32. 
 278. BALLANTINE, supra note 179, § 67, at 234. 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 42–58 (discussing the modernization of 
corporation law). 
 280. Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded?, 33 YALE 
L.J. 49, 59 (1923). 
 281. See id. (stating that “the doctrine of special powers cannot stand”); Modification of 
Ultra Vires, supra note 275, at 281-82 (describing various approaches to limit the use of 
ultra vires); Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Proposed Revision to the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 12 
CORNELL L.Q. 453, 455-57 (1927) (proposing to eliminate ultra vires and instead bind a 
corporation by the acts of its agents as against a party entitled to assume that the agents 
acted within the authority conferred on them); Robert S. Stevens, A Proposal as to its 
Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 YALE L.J. 297, 299 (1927) 
(noting a legislature could simply destroy the premise of ultra vires). 
 282. Unif. Bus. Corp. Act § 11 (1930); see also Stevens, supra note 281, at 334-35 
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corporation had the capacity “to act possessed by natural persons,” but the 
authority to perform “only such acts as are necessary or proper to 
accomplish its purposes and which are not repugnant to law.”283  By stating 
that a corporation had the same capacity to perform an act as did a natural 
person, the law eliminated the possibility that an act would not bind a 
corporation solely because the act was beyond the corporation’s purposes, 
even though the act may have been unauthorized.284  Concerned that this 
repudiation was too subtle, the drafters of Ohio’s statute largely eliminated 
the possibility of asserting that a contract was void because it was ultra 
vires.  The Act stated that “[n]o limitations on the exercise of the authority 
of the corporation shall be asserted in any action between the corporation 
and any person, except by or on behalf of the corporation against a director 
or officer or a person having actual knowledge of such limitation.”285  A 
corporation could invoke ultra vires only in a suit against an officer or 
director who authorized an ultra vires act, or against a third person who 
knew that a corporation lacked power to enter into a contract.  California’s 
revision also eliminated the doctrine, a change that Henry Ballantine 
described as “the most original contribution of the California Act.”286  
Under the California Act “[n]o limitation upon the business, purposes or 
powers of the corporation or upon the powers of the shareholders, officers 
or directors . . . shall be asserted as between the corporation or any 
shareholder and any third person,” and it provided that “[a]ny contract or 
conveyance made in the name of the corporation . . . [or] done within the 
scope of the authority, actual or apparent, given by the directors . . . shall 
bind the corporation.”287  By the early 1930s, similar legislative reforms 
became standard solutions to the “ultra vires problem.”288 
(discussing the elimination of the doctrine of limited capacity and the application of 
principles of agency, estoppel, and laches to ultra vires). 
 283. Unif. Bus. Corp. Act § 11 (1930). 
 284. See Unif. Bus. Corp. Act § 11 Commissioners’ Notes (reflecting the UBCA’s clear 
intent to bind a corporation by its agents’ apparent authority, even though the agent’s act 
was ultra vires—a departure from existing doctrine). 
 285. Ballantine, supra note 281, at 456. 
 286. Henry W. Ballantine, Problems in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 17 A.B.A. 
J. 579, 579 (1931). 
 287. BALLANTINE, supra note 102, at 330-31 (quoting CAL. CODE § 345).  California’s 
code protected third parties that dealt with a corporation from ultra vires claims, but still 
allowed shareholders and the state to “enjoin the doing or continuation of unauthorized 
business by the corporation and/or its officers.”  Id. at 330. 
 288. See ROBERT STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 1019-
28, app. “Statutory Provisions Relating to Ultra Vires Problems” (West 1949) (surveying the 
legislative reforms). 
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V. FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, AND THE 1930S 
States continued to produce new corporation laws into the 1930s and 
beyond.  Ohio’s 1927 revision was followed by new corporation laws in 
such states as Idaho (1929), Indiana (1929), Louisiana (1928), California 
(1931), Michigan (1931), Pennsylvania (1931), Illinois (1933), Minnesota 
(1933), and Washington (1933).289  In 1937, the same year Wiley Rutledge 
foresaw “a procession which will grow longer and longer until perhaps the 
entire country will be included,”290 Wisconsin prepared to revise its 
corporation act.291  In ordinary times, such a succession of reforms would 
be unsurprising.  But, these were not ordinary times.  The thread of 
corporation law revisions spanned years, during which the adoption of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
fundamentally changed the federal system for regulating the issue and 
trading of securities.292  What effect did these acts have on corporation law 
reform? 
Not as much as might be expected.  The Securities Acts, particularly 
the Securities Act of 1933, did not trigger a wholesale revision of state 
corporation law or eliminate the need for reform; and that was not their 
goal.293  The core of the Securities Acts is disclosure; the Acts for the most 
part allow corporations to issue securities as they wish, so long as they give 
potential purchasers extensive information about the securities.294  The 
Acts’ disclosure requirements aimed to provide shareholders and would-be 
shareholders more information about issuers than previously available, 
information that no doubt increased purchasers’ power generally and would 
have ended some corporations’ abusive practices in the 1920s.295  For 
example, the 1933 Act required an issuer to disclose, among other things, 
all options “outstanding or to be created in connection with the security to 
 289. See Garrett, supra note 11, at 416 (listing states). 
 290. Rutledge, supra note 11, at 309. 
 291. See Garrison, supra note 152, at 417-18 (noting that work on revising Wisconsin 
law began in 1935).  Wisconsin took its time and did not finally adopt a revised act until 
1951.  Garrett, supra note 11, at 421. 
 292. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 162-67 (Yale 
Univ. Press 2002) (discussing the emergence of the Acts following the Depression). 
 293. See, e.g., Dodd, The Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal 
Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917, 933-35 (1941) (describing changes under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934); Mark, supra note 12, at 629-32 (noting that the Securities Acts 
sought to avoid encroaching on the equity jurisdiction of state courts). 
 294. The 1933 Act sets out a rigid schedule that issuers must follow before they issue 
securities, and the 1934 Act includes stringent anti-fraud requirements. 
 295. Arguably, the disclosure requirements were not novel, as many were already 
present in state Blue Sky laws and the listing requirements of the New York Stock 
Exchange; “[w]hat was new was that these requirements now had federal imprimatur.”  
Mark, supra note 12, at 631. 
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be offered,” together with the names of any person allotted more than ten 
percent of those options,296 a requirement that would have made impossible 
the secret issuance of options that agitated Berle.297  The 1934 Act’s 
requirements for annual and quarterly reports from an issuer similarly 
would have helped shareholders, as would section 14 of the 1934 Act, 
which set rules for corporate voting.  Section 14 was significant not only 
because it required greater disclosure to shareholders in the election of 
directors, but it also required that shareholders, when asked to vote on 
“such matters as changes in the rights of any class of security holders,” be 
given “a description of the material differences which the proposed change 
would make and also a statement of the present financial condition of the 
corporation.”298  Yet these reforms did not target all corporate abuses; even 
while Congress was passing the Securities Acts, New Deal stalwarts Berle 
and William O. Douglas actively, though ultimately unsuccessfully, pushed 
for the adoption of a separate federal incorporation statute, which they 
believed necessary to work genuine change in corporate governance on a 
national scale.299 
Two federal securities acts did work fundamental changes in 
corporation law, but these were not the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and they 
applied only to a limited set of corporations.  The Public Utilities Holding 
Company Act of 1935 (“PUHCA”) and the Investment Company Act of 
1940 each imposed an array of requirements on their industries, to the point 
where the corporation law that governed them was substantially 
federalized.300  Under PUHCA, for instance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission took control over a range of issues related to public utilities 
holding companies, including “the issue of new securities, the acquisition 
of additional utility properties, proxy solicitations, dividend payments, 
intercompany contracts and loans, the modification of shareholders’ rights, 
and the modification of bondholders’ and other creditors’ rights in cases of 
reorganization.”301  Similarly, the Investment Company Act fundamentally 
changed the laws that regulated what became mutual funds, and set out 
detailed requirements for those firms’ capital structures and governance.302 
 296. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000), sched. A(10). 
 297. SELIGMAN, supra note 243, at 70 (“[V]irtually every undisclosed aspect of the 
option warrants issued by J.P. Morgan in connection with the United Corporation would 
have been revealed by Schedule A.”). 
 298. Dodd, supra note 293, at 934-35. 
 299. A. C. Prichard & Robert Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 11 
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. John M. Olin Center for Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 08-
014, 2008). 
 300. See id. at 2-3, 6 n.14 (discussing PUHCA and the Investment Company Act). 
 301. Dodd, supra note 293, at 938. 
 302. See Alfred Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U. L.Q. 303 
(1940) (detailing the factors that legislators considered when they drafted the Investment 
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The comprehensive regulations imposed on these two industries 
through these Acts only emphasize the degree to which the 1933 and 1934 
Acts left vast reaches of corporation law unaffected.  As Merrick Dodd 
wrote in 1940: 
[M]any of the evils to which we have referred have been left 
untouched by these new statutes except in the cases of two 
special types of corporations—public utility holding companies 
and their subsidiaries, and investment corporations.  It is only 
with respect to these two types of corporations that Congress has 
legislated with a view to preventing unsound and over-
complicated capital structures.  It is only in the case of public 
utility holding companies that the revamping of these structures 
by means of charter amendments—a process too often utilized by 
management as a means of extorting concessions from preferred 
shareholders—has been subjected to administrative 
supervision.303 
In sum, the Securities Acts provided some protection for shareholders, 
but neither protected them from many of the abuses scholars identified in 
the 1920s, nor did the Acts take the place of state corporation law. 
The state-level reform efforts of the 1920s flowed in an unbroken 
stream through the 1930s and beyond.  As late as 1951, one observer, 
referring to the wave of revised corporation acts dating to 1927, spoke of 
the “wave of modernization that is still in motion.”304  Yet, it was also in 
the postwar period that the loose movement for corporation law reform 
crested and successors emerged.  Since the mid-1920s, state corporation 
law reformers had pushed state-by-state statutory revisions, drawing on 
models provided by the Uniform Act, other states’ revised corporation 
codes, and the loose network for reform that slowly formed during the first 
wave of reform.  In 1946, however, a new chapter began in reform efforts 
when the American Bar Association completed a successor to the Uniform 
Act, the Model Business Corporation Act.305  In many ways, the Model Act 
sought to carry forward the goals of the previous generation of reformers.  
Like the Uniform Act and many “modern” corporation acts, the Model Act 
aimed to update corporation law to both serve business and protect 
shareholders; indeed, one stated goal of the new Model Act was to 
strengthen the rights of shareholders, which had “almost ceased to exist in 
some states.”306  Yet, the Model Act also tried to move beyond the Uniform 
Company Act of 1940). 
 303. Dodd, supra note 293, at 946-47. 
 304. Garrett, supra note 11, at 412. 
 305. Ray Garrett, History, Purpose, and Summary of the Model Business Corporation 
Act, 6 BUS. LAW. vii (1950). 
 306. Id. at x. 
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Act and the earlier generation of modern corporation acts, which for all 
their virtues had often differed among themselves in matters large and 
small.307  The Model Act’s drafters hoped that it would signal a new era 
and result in a genuinely standard corporation law.308  Its issuance marked a 
continuation of the movement to modernize corporation laws, but also the 
end of that movement’s first era. 
 CONCLUSION 
For over a century, observers have identified competition for 
corporation charters as the engine of change in corporation law.  States, it 
has been argued or assumed, changed their corporation laws to attract 
incorporations, either to compete for incorporations on a national stage or 
at least keep local corporations from incorporating elsewhere.  Modern 
corporation law, so the tale goes, is the inexorable result of this process, 
and the logic of competition is to be credited or blamed for the contours of 
that law. 
This Article significantly complicates that story, presenting an account 
that emphasizes the mixed and sometimes inconsistent motives of 
corporation laws’ drafters and their ambiguous legacies.  To be sure, state 
competition was an important factor in the development of the “modern” 
corporation statutes of the 1920s and 1930s, but it was a particular kind of 
competition:  the states discussed here—or, more accurately, influential 
groups within these states—did not always aim to produce laws that were 
more attractive to corporations than those of Delaware or other states; 
many aimed merely to produce laws that were sufficiently attractive that 
they would dissuade local corporations from reincorporating elsewhere.  
Furthermore, competition for incorporations was not the sole motive 
behind the reforms.  The acts’ drafters were, through the statutes, not 
merely responding to competition but attempting to address both 
widespread concerns about changes in American capitalism and the fear 
that corporate management would soon be in a position to overmaster 
shareholders.  The acts were thus responses not only to immediate 
competitive pressures but also to larger currents in American society and 
American thought about giant corporations. 
What does this tell us about the history and production of corporation 
law?  It suggests, first, that earlier versions have presented a one-sided 
 307. Commentators criticized the Uniform Act, for instance, because few states adopted 
the law wholesale, although others borrowed some of its provisions.  See Garrett, supra note 
11, at 420 (detailing the extent to which certain states adopted the Model Business Code). 
 308. Though beyond the scope of this Article, observers have noted the great deal of 
uniformity existing in today’s state corporation statutes.  See William J. Carney, The 
Production of Corporation Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715, 729 (1997). 
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account of the law’s development by focusing almost completely on the 
power of competition to shape corporation law.  Of course, as this Article 
itself shows, competition was important.  But competition was not the only 
significant influence on the laws; so were the hopes and fears of reformers, 
who often sought in the laws to respond to what they perceived as deeper 
trends in American corporate governance and, indeed, social and economic 
life.  Indeed, the movement to modernize corporation law can only be 
understood if we widen our focus to take into account not only state 
competition but all the diverse and competing influences that combined to 
produce the new laws. 
More fundamentally, this Article suggests the need to adopt a new and 
broader understanding of the development of corporation law.  Despite a 
few recent dissents,309 the standard story of corporation law has presented 
its evolution over the past century as a remarkably mechanical process.  
The story goes roughly like this:  corporate federalism created the 
possibility of competition for charters; states began to compete for charters, 
producing laws to attract incorporators; once competition began, states 
were compelled to continually update the laws simply to stay competitive; 
and the resulting dynamic drove states to adopt laws that either scaled the 
heights of economic efficiency or paved a downward path to managerial 
dominion and exploitation.  It may have been a race to the top or to the 
bottom, but the race was unavoidable either way. 
This Article provides an alternative way to think about corporation 
law’s development.  While acknowledging the importance of state 
competition, it unearths other influences that also shaped corporation law, 
and thereby attempts to present a more complex and nuanced account of 
the law’s evolution.  It depicts the development of corporation law not 
solely as the result of state competition, but as a contingent, conflicted, and 
fragmented historical process.  It was contingent, in that it did not have to 
happen this way.  Some states adopted new corporation laws early, others 
waited longer, and some did not change their laws at all, for reasons 
internal to the states and their peculiar circumstances.  Conflicted, in that 
the laws arose out of, and eventually embodied, motives that did not always 
mesh easily.  Their backers aimed to respond to both local economic 
demands and national concerns, which yielded laws that aspired to both 
please corporate managers and protect shareholders.  Fragmented, in that 
the reform efforts, while connected, were not of a piece.  Some states were 
out front in reform efforts while others lagged behind, and the laws 
eventually produced varied depending on the politics of the adopting state, 
and the judgment and concerns of their drafters.  Corporation law, in sum, 
 309. See, e.g., Robert Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor:  The Limited Implications of 
Federalism for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
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is the product of complex and competing influences, and only when we 
acknowledge this will we be able to provide satisfying accounts of its 
development. 
 
